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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(j).

STATEMENT OF ISSUES
.1.-

Viewing the evidence, .-•-; he inferences fro

- evidence, in ,i li«phi most

favorable to support the unanimous verdict of the jury, did the Siggards perform the steps
necessary to forfeit CIC's interest in the Contract?
Standard of Review. In reviewing a jury verdict, the appellate court must view
the evidence in the light most supportive of the verdict and assume that the jury believed
those aspects of the evidence to sustain its judgment and will upset a jury verdict only upon a
showing "that the evidence so clearly preponderates in favor of the appellant that reasonable
people wo

ot differ 01 i tl le outcoi i le of the case." Billings v. Union Bankers Ins. Co.,

918 P.2d 461 (Utah 1996).
2.

Viewin*-

f

evidence,

•

:

nferences froi n the evic lence, ii i a light most

favorable to support the unanimous verdict of the jury, did CIC's Notice of Interest, filed on
property to whicl l it 1 lad i IC • legal i igl it, violate

*•

!

i'en Statute?

Standard of Review. Same as Issue 1.

DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Utah Code Annotated § 38-9-1, Liability of Person Filing Wrongful Lien:
A person who claims an interest in, or a lien or encumbrance
against, real property, who causes or has caused a document asserting
that claim to be recorded or filed in the office of the county recorder,
who knows or has reason to know that the document is forged,
185112.2

groundless, or contains a material misstatement or false claim, is liable
to the owner or title-holder for $1,000 or for treble actual damages,
whichever is greater, and for reasonable attorney fees, and costs as
provided in this chapter, if he willfully refuses to release or correct such
document of record within 20 days from the date of written request from
the owner or beneficial title-holder of the real property. This chapter is
not intended to be applicable to mechanics' or materialmen's liens.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case. This case, as ultimately tried to the jury, is one for

specific performance of a real estate contract. When the buyer of the property, Commercial
Investment Corporation ("CIC"), failed to make the required annual interest payment due
under the contract, the property owners, Don and Glenna Siggard, as trustees of the Don and
Glenna F. Siggard Family Trust ("Siggards"), exercised their right to declare a default of the
contract, and provided CIC with written notice of the default and of the thirty day period to
cure the default. When CIC did not cure its default under the contract, the Siggards
exercised their contractual right to declare the contract terminated and sent notice of that
termination to CIC, which CIC received two days prior to the end of the 30-day cure period.
Although CIC received and understood the notice of its default and knew the period of time
in which it had to cure its default, CIC did nothing to cure the default or otherwise attempt
to perform its obligations under the contract. Instead, in an attempt to preserve an interest
in property it did not want to pay for, CIC, one day prior to forfeiture, recorded a Notice of
Interest on the entire 38 acre parcel of the Siggards' property, even though it had a
contractual right to purchase only 16 acres. Two years later, after CIC initiated this action,
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and the Siggards were made aware of CIC's wrongful Notice of Interest, the Siggards
counterclaimed for breach of contract, breach of covenant of good fa;

- .< • .:• joaling,

unjust enrichment and CIC's violation of the Utah Wrongful Lien Statute by the filing of the
Notice of Interest.
B.

Course of Proceedings. CIC filed its lawsuit in 1992, two years after

CIC's default of the required $56,000.00 annual interest payment due under the contract and
after the Siggards' notice to CIC that the contract was terminated. CIC's original complaint
alleged claims for breach of contract, unjust enrichment and rescission. (Complaint, R
It was not

-7.)

a year later, and after the Siggards had discovered the lien on their property

and demanded that the Notice of Interest recorded against the Siggards' property be released,
and counterclaimed for violation of the I JtalI Wrongful I ieiI Statute that CIC decided it was
now interested in the property and amended its Complaint to add a claim for specific
performance. (Ai i iei ided Cot i iplaii it, R. 295-30*' J1 Helme irul. t'1*'" dated specific
performance as its sole remedy in the lawsuit and relinquished its other claims. (Election of
Remedies and Motion for Non-jury ')
C.

o33-34; .•

'•

- « V-M>

K.)

Disposition. In August 1995, the case was tried to a jury on CIC's claim

for specific performance and the Siggards' counterclaims. After a four-day trial, the jury
returned a unanimous special verdict, finding that CIC was not entitled to specific
performance, that CIC was not excused from its obligation to make the annual $56,000.00
interest payment, that CIC breached the contract and its covenant of good faith and fair
dealing, and that CIC violated the Utah Wrongful Lien Statute. (Special Verdict, R. 1023-
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1025, Add. L.) The jury also found that the Siggards had performed all steps necessary to
forfeit CIC's interest in the contract. (Special Verdict, R. 1023-1024, Add. L.) The trial
court entered judgment incorporating the jury's findings on August 18, 1995. (Judgment,
R. 1064-1067, Add. M.)
CIC moved for a new trial on the wrongful lien and forfeiture issues.
(R. 1146-1147.) Judge Iwasaki denied that Motion, ruling that:
1.
The evidence submitted to the jury . . . was
sufficient to support the jury's findings that CIC's filing of
the Notice of Interest violated the Utah Wrongful Lien
Statute and that the Siggards performed all steps necessary
to forfeit CIC's interest in the real estate contract.
2.
The law presented to and applied by the jury at
trial as to those issues was correct.

(Order Denying Motion for New Trial, R. 1288-1290, Add. N.) Additionally, the Court
granted judgment in favor of the Siggards for its attorneys' fees and costs associated with the
wrongful lien claim in the amount of $17,325.00 (R. 1219-1295, Add. P). CIC appealed the
case to the Utah Supreme Court (R. 1302-1304) and the case was transferred to this Court on
January 11, 1996. (R. 1364.)

STATEMENT OF FACTS
In the early 1970s, Don and Glenna Siggard acquired a 60 acre parcel of property
at the intersection of 11400 South and 1000 East, located in Sandy, Utah. (R. 1680,
Tr. 372:3-17.) The Siggards purchased the property for their retirement, believing it would

185112 2

4

eventually be a good investment. Don Siggard had worked as a brick mason for 30 years as
his life's occupation. (R. 1679, Tr. 370:13-14.) During this period, Mr. Siggard obtained a
contractor's license and constructed several homes, which he either lived in himself, built for
his children, or sold to third parties. (R. 1680, Tr. 371:10-24; Tr. 374:16-23.) By 1989 the
Siggards still owned 38 acres of the original 60 acre parcel, which had been placed in a
family trust known as the Don and Glenna F. Siggard Family Trust. (R. 1692, Tr. 422:25,
423:1-13.) This 38 acre parcel is the subject of this lawsuit.
In 1988 Busch Corporation, a Utah corporation owned by Bob Busch ("Busch")
(R. 1564, Tr. 14:15-24), expressed interest in purchasing a portion of the Siggards' property
for commercial development. Busch was a commercial property developer who, for the
previous two decades, had been involved in the development and construction of numerous
office buildings, shopping centers and other commercial developments both in Utah and other
states. (R. 1564, Tr. 14:25, 15:1-9.) Busch was the owner or principal party "in all kinds
of companies" (R. 1619, Tr. 198:7-8), including Busch Corporation (R. 1564, Tr. 14:15-18),
Development West (R. 1565, Tr. 18:2-10), Busch Properties, Inc. (R. 1631, Tr. 245:1-8),
and Commercial Investment Corporation ("CIC"). (R. 1565 Tr. 17:10-13.) On March 3,
1988, the Busch Corporation "or its assigns" entered into an Earnest Money Agreement with
the Siggards to purchase 20 acres of the Siggards' 38 acre parcel. (Trial Ex. 1, Add. A.)
It was CIC that eventually entered into a Real Estate Contract with the Siggards.
(Trial Ex. 7, Add. B.) CIC was a holding company for one of Busch's many operating
companies, either Development West (R. 1619, Tr. 197:8-18) or Busch Properties, Inc.

185112 2

5

(R. 1620, Tr. 199:7-11.) CIC maintained no bank accounts (R. 1620, Tr. 199:7-11), or
checking accounts. (R. 1631, Tr. 245:15-18.) It had no employees (R. 1619, Tr. 197:6)
nor paid any payroll (R. 1619, Tr. 197:8-16), and otherwise was entirely dependent upon the
assets of Busch's various other companies. (R. 1620, Tr. 199:18-24.)
On August 31, 1988, the Siggards and CIC entered into a Real Estate Contract (the
"Contract") for the purchase of 20 acres ("Property") of the Siggards' 38 acre parcel of
property. (Trial Ex. 7, Add. B.) The Contract expressly defined the property to be
purchased by CIC as "approximately 20 acres of real property (the "Property") located at the
southeast corner of 11400 South and 1000 East. . . . " (Trial Ex. 7, 1 1, Add. B.) The
Contract further provided that CIC would purchase the property under the following
contractual obligations, among others:

185112 2

a.

CIC was to pay a down payment of $5,000 (Trial Ex. 7, f 2,
Add. B);

b.

CIC was to obtain commercial zoning of the 20 acres by March 3,
1989 (Trial Ex. 7, 1 16, Add. B);

c.

CIC was to designate the 20 acres it intended to purchase out of the
38 acre parcel (Trial Ex. 7, K 1, Add. B);

d.

CIC was to pay ten annual interest payments of $69,500 to be paid
on or before March 3 of each year, beginning March 3, 1989 (Trial
Ex. 7, f 2, Add. B); and

6

e.

CIC was to pay a principal payment of $695,000 at the end of the
ten year term (Trial Ex. 7, 1 2, Add. B; R. 888-889, Pretrial Order,
I4.(d), (e)and(f), Add. K.)1

CIC also covenanted in the Contract "to keep the Property free and clear of all
liens and encumbrances resulting from the acts of Buyer during the term of this Contract,
except for property which Buyer purchases under Section 4 herein." Subsection 4 of the
Real Estate Contract referred to the 20 acre parcel CIC contracted to purchase. (Trial Ex. 7,
f 4 , 11, Add. B.)
Although CIC entered into the Contract with the Siggards, which obligated CIC to
make payments of principal and interest on the property in excess of $1 million over the term
of the Contract, CIC actually made no payments under the Contract. (R. 1631,
Tr. 244:21-25, 245:1.) Although the Contract provided an acknowledgment that CIC had
paid the required $5,000.00 down payment, (Trial Ex. 7, f 2, Add. B), the down payment
was never paid, either by CIC or any of the other Busch companies. (R. 1577, Tr. 67:2025, 68:1-12; R. 1761, Tr. 695:6-21.) The one and only payment made in furtherance of the
Contract was made by Busch Properties, Inc. after Busch had re-negotiated an amendment to
the Contract. (R. 1631, Tr. 244:21-25, 245:1; Tr. Ex. 18, Add. E.)
In March 1989 CIC had not met several of its obligations under the Contract.
(R. 1686, Tr. 396:13-21.) CIC had not obtained rezoning of the 20 acres required to be

1

The Contract was amended in March 1989, reducing the amount of acreage CIC would
purchase from 20 acres to 16 acres, thereby reducing the annual interest payments in
paragraph (d) above from $69,500 to $56,000 and the principal payment from $695,000 to
$560,000. (Tr. Ex. 17, Add. D.)
185112 2
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zoned commercial by March 3, 1989. (R. 1686, Tr. 398:5-23; R. 1605, 142:10-13; Trial
Ex. 17, Add. D.) CIC had not paid the $5,000.00 down payment required under the
Contract. (R. 1577, Tr. 67:20-25, 68:1-12; R. 1761, Tr. 675:6-21.) Nor had CIC paid the
first annual interest installment that was due March 3, 1989. (R. 1686, Tr. 396:13-21.)
Three days later, on March 6, 1989, Mr. Siggard hand-delivered a hand-written "Notice of
Default" to CIC informing CIC of its default of the Contract and requesting that CIC cure
the default or the Contract would terminate in 30 days. (R. 1686, Tr. 396:20-25; 397:1-13;
Tr. Ex. 16, Add. C.)
Upon CIC's receipt of the March 6, 1989 Notice of Default, rather than pay the
$69,500.00 interest installment, CIC requested that the Siggards re-negotiate the Contract and
defer the interest payment installment then due until after CIC had either subdivided the
property or completed commercial development on the property. (R. 1687, Tr. 399:8-17.)
CIC further sought to reduce the size of the parcel CIC was obligated to purchase from the
original 20 acres, to 10 acres, thereby reducing the value of the Contract by $690,000.00.
(R. 1686, Tr. 398:5-25; 399:1-7; Trial Ex. 7.) Ultimately, the Siggards agreed to a
reduction in the acreage to be purchased from 20 acres to 16 acres (R. 1687, Tr. 399:5-7;
Trial Ex. 17, Add. D.), but the Siggards did not relinquish their right to timely payment of
the annual interest installment. (R. 1687, Tr. 399:8-25; Trial Ex. 17, Add. D.)
As a result of this negotiation, CIC and the Siggards entered into an Amendment
of the Real Estate Contract ("Amendment"), which reduced the acreage to be purchased to
16 acres and deleted the requirement that CIC obtain commercial zoning on the property
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prior to March 3, 1989. (Trial Ex. 17, Add. D.) Upon amendment of the Contract, the first
interest installment, now $56,000.00, was paid on March 30, 1989 by check drawn on the
account of Busch Properties, Inc.2 (R. 1687, Tr. 399:18-23; R. 1631, 244:22-25; 245:1;
Tr. Ex. 18, Add. E.) This initial payment of $56,000.00 would be the only payment the
Siggards would ever receive on a contract that, under its amended terms, was to have paid
them in excess of $1 million in principal and interest payments. (R. 1690, Tr. 411:12-14.)
As previously noted, CIC never paid the $5,000.00 down payment, and CIC (nor any other
Busch company) did not make, or offer to make, any of the subsequent annual interest
payments that came due on March 3, 1990, or that would be due each succeeding March 3
thereafter (had the Contract been in effect). (R. 1690, Tr. 411:12-14.)
After the parties executed the Amendment to the Contract, CIC worked with Sandy
City to obtain a commercial zoning designation for the 16 acres it intended to purchase.
(R. 1605, Tr. 142:14-25; R. 1606, 143:1-14.) The negotiations with Sandy City ultimately
resulted in Sandy City's approval of rezoning, with numerous restrictions placed on the
commercial development. (Trial Ex. 14.) Sandy City imposed a restriction that any
commercial development of the Property would be limited to 10 net acres, and numerous
other restrictions, including the widening of 11400 South, restricting the hours of operation
of the proposed commercial center, and requiring participation in the costs of installing
traffic signals at the intersection of 11400 South and 1000 East. (R. 1605, Tr. 142:4-25;
2

This first annual installment was paid reluctantly. Mr. Siggard testified that after
Busch wrote the check "he threw it down on the desk and he stormed out of the room." (R.
1687, Tr. 399:18-23).
185112 2
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R. 1606, 143:1-14; R. 1641, 285:20-25, 286; Trial Ex. 14.) The additional cost of just one
of these restrictions, the widening of 11400 South, was a potentially costly proposition.
(R. 1643, Tr. 294:4-8.)
Shortly after Sandy City approved the restricted commercial zoning, CIC, through
Busch, informed Mr. Siggard that the zoning had been approved and asked Mr. Siggard if he
would defer the payment of the second $56,000.00 interest installment due on March 3,
1990, until after CIC had completed commercial development of the 10 acre parcel.
(R. 1688, Tr. 405:2-7.) Mr. Siggard declined this request. (R. 1688, Tr. 405:7.)
Having been informed of the zoning change in August or September of 1989,
Mr. Siggard asked CIC which 16 acre portion of the 38 acre parcel CIC wanted surveyed,
which was a contractual obligation for the Siggards under the Contract. (R. 1688,
Tr. 405:8-25; 406:1-25; Trial Ex. 7, 1 12, Add. B.) Mr. Siggard was told that CIC was not
certain which exact area it wanted surveyed, and that CIC would inform Mr. Siggard, at
some later date, as to the area CIC wanted surveyed. (R. 1688, Tr. 406:20-22.) In
anticipation of CIC's designation of the property to be surveyed, and the 45-day period in
which he would need to complete such a survey, Mr. Siggard immediately retained a
surveyor to perform the survey once CIC designated the parcel it intended to purchase.
(R. 1688, Tr. 404:17-23; R. 1732, 579:18-25; Trial Ex. 27, Add. J.) Time passed, and,
despite Mr. Siggard's repeated requests that CIC identify the 16 acre parcel to be surveyed
(R. 1688-1689, Tr. 406:19-25, 407:1-23), CIC never informed Mr. Siggard what portion of
the 38 acre parcel it intended to purchase. (R. 1688-1689, Tr. 406:1-25; 407:1-2.) CIC,

185112 2

10

after being asked three times for its designation, ultimately told Mr. Siggard that CIC "would
let him know" when it determined what portion of the property CIC would purchase.
(R. 1689, Tr. 407:22-25; 408:1-2.) After this communication, CIC never contacted Mr.
Siggard to designate the area to be surveyed. (R. 1689, Tr. 409:5-13.)
On March 3, 1990 the second $56,000.00 interest installment, the installment CIC
had tried to postpone in August or September of 1989, became due and was not paid.
(R. 1689, Tr. 409:24-25, 410:1.) Having received no payment, Mr. Siggard drafted a
Notice of Default, and sent it certified mail to CIC. (R. 1689, Tr. 410:7-25, Add. F.) CIC
received the letter on March 5, 1990. (R. 1689-1690, Tr. 410:7-25; 411:1-11; Pretrial
Order, Add. K.; Trial Ex. 20, Add. F.) Busch read and reviewed the March 5, 1990 letter,
(R. 1610, Tr. 161:3-14), and understood from the letter that CIC had 30 days in which to
make the overdue $56,000.00 interest installment or CIC would forfeit its rights in the
Property. (R. 1610-1611, Tr. 162:20-25, 163:1-15.) Neither Busch, nor any other CIC
representative, contacted Mr. Siggard after receipt of the Notice of Default on March 5,
1990. (R. 1690, Tr. 411:12-14.)
Thirty-one days after the March 3, 1990 payment had been due, Mr. Siggard,
having received no response from CIC, drafted and caused a second notice, dated April 3,
1990, to be delivered to CIC. (R. 1690, Tr. 411:18-23.) This April 3, 1990 notice stated
that CIC had not cured its default and that the Contact was therefore terminated pursuant to
its terms. (R. 1690, Tr. 411:18-23; Trial Ex. 21, Add. G.) CIC received the second notice
on April 3, 1990, thirty-one days after the delinquent payment had been due, but two days
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prior to the end of the 30 day cure period, which period had begun to run from CIC's receipt
of the March 5, 1990 Notice. (R. 1690, Tr. 412:22-25; Pretrial Order, R. 890, Add. K.)
Mr. Siggard believed the 30 day cure period began to run from March 3, 1990, the date the
payment was due, rather than March 5, 1990, the date CIC actually received the March 5,
1990 notice. (R. 1690, Tr. 412:16-25.)
Notwithstanding this early notice, CIC understood that it had two days remaining
before CIC would forfeit any rights under the Contract (R. 1611, Tr. 166:21-25; R. 1633,
251:24-25; 252:1-2), and acknowledged, through Busch, that CIC could have paid the
$56,000.00 during those remaining two days, had CIC so desired. (R. 1633, Tr. 252:7-10.)
Busch's testimony was:
Q:

Okay. In that two day period, from April 3rd to April 5th, did
you pay $56,000.00 to Don and Glenna Siggard?

A:

No, but I could have.

(R. 1633, Tr. 252:7-10.) Busch, as CIC's president, also acknowledged that he knew the
payment had come due on March 3, 1990 and that CIC had an obligation to pay it.
(R. 1614-1615, Tr. 178:24-25, 179:1-2.) Busch further admitted that CIC never made the
$56,000.00 payment, and that CIC never offered to make it. (R. 1612, Tr. 167:12-18.) No
evidence was submitted to the jury by CIC that receiving the letter two days early made any
difference to CIC. Indeed, it is clear from the evidence that CIC had no intention of paying
the $56,000.00 payment on March 3, 1990 or before April 5, 1990, the end of the 30 day
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cure period.3 (R. 1612, Tr. 167:22-25; 168:1.) CIC claimed that Mr. Siggard had refused
to provide a survey, and thus, CIC alleged, the Siggards were in breach of the Contract,
which alleged breach somehow excused CIC from tendering the $56,000.00 payment.
(R. 1612, Tr:167:22-25; 168:1; Appellant's Brief, 10.)4 In short, CIC did not believe it
owed the Siggards the $56,000.00 interest installment. (R. 1634, Tr. 257:1-11.)
Rather than make the $56,000.00 interest installment payment as required under
the Contract, or tender it in any fashion, Busch "immediately called my counsel and said,
'Send Mr. Siggard a letter'" (R. 1612, Tr. 167:4-5) and further instructed CIC's lawyer to
put Mr. Siggard "on notice that he was in violation of the contract and that, you know, I said
'Just do all the necessary things legally to be done.'" (R. 1612, Tr. 167:6-11.) CIC did not
make the $56,000.00 payment to Mr. Siggard (R. 1612, Tr. 167:12-14) and never offered to
make it (R. 1612, Tr. 167:17-18).
On April 4, 1990, one day before the cure period expired, CIC's counsel prepared
a letter, as instructed by CIC (R. 1612, Tr. 167:4-11), and sent it to Mr. Siggard (Trial

3

As March has 31 days, the 30 day cure period would begin on March 7, 1990, the day
after CIC's receipt of the March 5, 1990 notice, and end on April 5, 1990.
4

The jury did not believe Busch's testimony that CIC requested a survey prior to the
March 3, 1990 installment payment deadline, and found, rather, that CIC breached the
Contract and was not excused from tendering its performance or from performing its
contractual obligations of making the payment. (Special Verdict, R. 1023, 1024, Add. L.)
(Judgment, R. 1064-1067, Add. M.) Indeed, CIC's own witness, Andrew Walton, an
employee of the Busch companies for 22 years (R. 1638, Tr. 271:12-13) testified that
Siggard never refused to provide CIC a survey. (R. 1644, Tr. 283:1-3.) CIC has not
contested the jury's findings on these issues. (Appellant's Brief, 15.)
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Ex. 23, Add. H.), which letter stated, among other things, that CIC considered the notices of
default defective because:
1.

The Amendment executed by Commercial Investment Corporation
on March 30, 1989 was not executed by Glenna Siggard, Trustee;

2.

Don Siggard and Glenna F. Siggard, as Trustees under the Don
and Glenna F. Siggard Family Trust Agreement had not sent any
notices required under paragraph 18 of the Real Estate Contract;5

3.

The April 3, 1990 notice was sent two days premature.

(Trial Ex. 23, Add. H.) In the letter, CIC's lawyer further told the Siggards that CIC had
received zoning approval from Sandy City, that a certified ALTA survey was due, and that
the Siggards were in breach of the Contract for failure to provide the survey. Additionally,
CIC's lawyer's letter of April 4, 1990 stated that CIC was ready to receive a trust deed and
note on the property pursuant to the terms of the Contract (Trial Ex. 23, Add. H).
Paragraph 3 of the Contract provided that CIC could request from the Siggards a warranty
deed and note on the Property after it had received both commercial zoning and site plan
approval on the Property. (Emphasis added.) (Trial Ex. 7, % 3, Add. B.) In fact, CIC had
not obtained site plan approval on the property and this demand was unjustified and
unwarranted under the terms of the Contract (R. 1633, Tr. 252:11-22). Busch admitted that
the demand was "a mistake." (R. 1633, Tr. 252:14-19.)

5

Evidently, either the fact that the Siggards failed to designate in their notices to CIC
that they were acting as "trustees", or that the documents were not signed by both trustees,
formed the basis of CIC's alleged non-performance of the terms of the Contract. In either
case, it seemed a trivial issue on which to hang one's rights to a valuable contract and risk
forfeiture of $56,000.00, a risk that could have easily been avoided with a simple offer to
make the admittedly due payment.
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The April 4, 1990 letter from CIC's lawyer was the first, and only time, that CIC
ever asked Siggards to provide a survey. (R. 1690, Tr. 414:1-3.)
In addition to having its lawyer send the April 4, 1990 letter, and rather than
paying the obligation admittedly due, CIC that same day, April 4, 1990, recorded a "Notice
of Interest" on the entire 38 acre parcel owned by the Siggards. (R. 1611; Tr. 165:14-24;
Trial Ex. 22, Add. I.) CIC recorded this lien on all 38 acres, even though the Contract, as
amended, entitled CIC to only 16 acres and even though CIC's interest was about to be
forfeited.6 (Trial Ex. 1, Add. D.) At the time CIC recorded the Notice of Interest on
Siggards' entire 38 acre parcel, CIC had in its possession legal descriptions for an 18.5 acre
parcel of the Property, (R. 1738, Tr. 605:7-19; Trial Exs. 3, 29), a 16.2 acre parcel of the
Property, (R. 1738, Tr. 605:20-25, 606:1-10; Trial Exs. 8, 29) and a 13 acre parcel of the
Property. (R. 1739, Tr. 608:11-19; Trial Exs. 14, 29.) Despite having these several legal
descriptions available to use for its Notice of Interest for smaller portions of the Property,
CIC chose instead to record its lien on the Siggards' entire 38 acres. (Trial Ex. 22,
Add. I.).

6

CIC attempted to justify filing its notice on all 38 acres because the Contract provided
CIC with the right to "designate" the 16 acres it wanted, and therefore, CIC argued, since it
had not designated what it wanted, it was entitled to lien the entire 38 acre parcel.
(Appellant's Brief, 5; R. 1611, Tr. 166:5-15.) This sham was not lost on the jury. The jury
heard evidence that Mr. Siggard had repeatedly requested CIC to designate the 16 acres
(R. 1689, Tr. 407:22-25), that the commercial development was always intended to take
place at one location, the intersection of 11400 South and 10th East (R. 1738-1739,
Tr. 605:7-26, 606:1-10, 608:11-19) as all site plans had designated the area for the
commercial development. (Trial Exs. 3, 8, 14, 29.)
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Not only did CIC record the Notice of Interest on all 38 acres of the Siggard's
property, CIC did not disclose that fact to the Siggards, making no mention of the Notice of
Interest in the lawyer's letter of April 4, 1990 (Trial Ex. 23, Add. 2) or at any time
thereafter. (R. 1692, Tr. 419:10-22.) CIC never told the Siggards that a Notice of Interest
had been recorded against their property. (R. 1692, Tr. 419:10-22.) The Siggards
subsequently discovered the Notice of Interest when CIC filed this lawsuit in August, 1992.
(R. 1692, Tr. 419:10-22.)
After the April 4, 1990 letter, the only communication CIC had with the Siggards
occurred 30 to 60 days later when Busch, in a telephone discussion with Mr. Siggard, asked
what Mr. Siggard intended to do with the property now that the Siggards "had the property
back". (R. 1691, Tr. 415:1-7.) In the same conversation, Busch asked the Siggards to
consider jointly developing the property in a partnership with him. (R. 1691, Tr. 415:22-25;
416:1-22.) Mr. Siggard declined the offer. (R. 1691, Tr. 415:25, 416:1.)
Approximately two years after recording its Notice of Interest on the Siggards
property, CIC brought a lawsuit against the Siggards seeking monetary damages for an
alleged breach of contract. (Complaint, R. 1-7.) On discovering that the Notice of Interest
had been recorded, the Siggards demanded that CIC release the Notice of Interest wrongfully
recorded against the property, as CIC's complaint sought only monetary damages and
asserted no right or interest in the Property. (Trial Ex. 43, Add. O.) The Notice of Interest
was not released however, and a year later CIC amended its complaint to include a claim for
relief for specific performance of the Contract. (R. 295, 300-305.) The Siggards
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counterclaimed seeking, among other things, damages for breach of contract and wrongful
lien. (R. 466-480.)
Additionally, "a week or ten days" before trial, (R. 1631, Tr. 245:17-23), and 5
years and 5 months after the March 3, 1990 payment was due, and after identical payments
of $56,000.00 each for March of 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994 and 1995, totaling $280,000.00,
(if the Contract had still been in force), had been ignored, CIC procured a Certificate of
Deposit in its name in the amount of $56,000.00, which it used in trial as a trial exhibit.
(Trial Ex. 40.) The stated purpose for the 1995 Certificate of Deposit was "to show that the
money was very available" to make the overdue payment, due on March 3, 1990, five years
before. (R. 1634, Tr. 257:12-18.)7
The matter was tried to a jury in August, 1995. The jury returned a unanimous
verdict in favor of the Siggards, specifically finding that CIC was not entitled to specific
performance, was not excused from performing its contractual obligations under the
Contract, and not entitled to assert an excuse because of waiver, estoppel and/or unclean
hands. (R. 1023, 1024, Add. L.) The jury further found that the Siggards performed all

7

After judgment had been entered against CIC, Siggards attempted to garnish the assets
of CIC's offered Certificate of Deposit for the $1,000.00 statutory penalty it had been
awarded (R-1068-1071) and to restrain CIC from removing its only asset (the Certificate of
Deposit), until a judgment on fees and costs had been obtained, for which the Siggards filed
a Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction. (R. 1100-1105,
1115-1118.) While the temporary restraining order was granted by Judge Iwasaki on August
22, 1995, the Certificate of Deposit (which was to mature on August 28, 1995) had already
been redeemed and the funds moved from CIC to one of the other Busch companies.
185112 2

17

steps necessary to forfeit CIC's interest in the Contract and that CIC's Notice of Interest was
a violation of the Utah Wrongful Lien Statute. (R. 1024, App. L.)
CIC filed a Motion for New Trial, which Motion was denied by Judge Iwasaki,
who found that CIC's arguments "were not compelling" and that "the evidence submitted to
the jury at the trial of this case was sufficient to support the jury's findings that CIC's filing
of the Notice of Interest violated the Utah Wrongful Lien Statute and that the Siggards
performed all steps necessary to forfeit CIC's interest in the Real Estate Contract."
(R. 1288-1290, App. N.) The judge subsequently awarded the Siggards its fees and costs of
$17,325.00 as the prevailing party on the wrongful lien issue. (R. 1291-1295, App. P.)
As the facts above demonstrate, the jury's verdict is supported by the evidence.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Standard of Review. To overturn a jury verdict, the court must first be
persuaded that the evidence on which the jury based its unanimous decision so clearly
preponderates in favor of CIC that reasonable people would not differ in finding for CIC.8
The evidence the jury relied on does not so preponderate, and accordingly, the jury verdict
must be affirmed.
The Notice of Forfeiture. Although CIC has not appealed the jury's denial of
specific performance, CIC in essence asks for specific performance now on appeal, and bases
its request on the fact that CIC received notice of the Siggards' election of the forfeiture
8

Since the jury unanimously decided against CIC, overturning it would necessarily
imply the members of the jury were not reasonable.
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remedy two days before the cure period had actually expired. Relying on this technicality,
CIC chooses to ignore the evidence the jury relied upon, namely that CIC received clear,
unambiguous notice of its default by the March 5, 1990 default notice, understood exactly
what it was required to do to cure the default and understood the consequence of a failure to
cure the default. In the face of that understanding, CIC did nothing to cure its default within
the time permitted by the Contract or at any time thereafter. Indeed, the evidence shows that
CIC intentionally chose not to cure the default, relying upon its spurious claims that the
Siggards were in breach of the contract, and therefore CIC's performance was excused. The
jury found that this reliance was unwarranted, and it was CIC that had breached the contract,
not the Siggards.
The jury had abundant evidence on which it could base its verdict that the Siggards
performed all the steps necessary to forfeit CIC's interest. The evidence before the jury was
that CIC received clear and unambiguous notice of default, that CIC knew of its contractual
obligation, that it knew it would forfeit its rights under the contract in 30 days unless it cured
its default, and that despite receiving and understanding the notices of default, CIC
intentionally made no attempt to cure its default. The evidence demonstrated to the jury that,
knowing the risk of forfeiture, CIC chose to attempt to excuse its performance by asserting
alleged breaches of Siggards' performance of the contract. These facts provide ample
evidence to support the jury's verdict.
The Wrongful Lien. Whether the recording of a particular lien is "groundless" is
an issue of fact left solely to the jury to decide. The jury determined the credibility of the
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evidence surrounding CIC's recording of the Notice of Interest on all 38 acres of the
Siggards' parcel and determined that CIC's lien was not supported by credible evidence.
While CIC now makes an argument for its action, that does not mean it had an "arguable
basis," given the evidence. The evidence submitted to the jury demonstrated that CIC's
claim, prior to forfeiture, was only to 16 acres, and that it had approximate legal descriptions
for smaller portions of the 38 acre parcel, upon which it ultimately filed its Notice of Lien.
Those legal descriptions had been prepared by CIC and designated the very area it intended
to place its commercial development on the Property. Once forfeited, CIC had no legitimate
claim to any of the property. The jury recognized the alternatives and the motive behind
CIC's action and correctly determined that CIC's lien was groundless. Accepting, as the
Court must, the inferences supporting the jury's verdict, the Court should affirm the jury's
decision.
Specific Performance. Before trial, CIC elected specific performance of the
Contract as its sole remedy, and did not seek any alternative remedies or relief at trial. The
jury expressly found that CIC was not entitled to specific performance, and CIC has not
appealed that verdict. (Appellant's Brief 15.) Nevertheless, CIC, by this appeal, seeks a
remedy that is indistinguishable from specific performance: to receive a new notice of default
and a new opportunity to cure; as if the last six years never happened. CIC is not entitled to
relief for a claim it has not appealed.
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ARGUMENT
I.

THE STANDARD OF REVIEW REQUIRES THE APPELLATE COURT TO
REVIEW THE EVIDENCE AND THE INFERENCES FROM THE
EVIDENCE IN THE LIGHT MOST SUPPORTIVE OF THE VERDICT.
CIC appeals the jury's unanimous verdict on two factual issues: Did the Siggards

perform all steps necessary to declare CIC's interest under the contract forfeited; and was
CIC's Notice of Interest groundless. On both issues CIC asks this Court to replace the jury's
judgment, which was formed after hearing the evidence and evaluating the credibility of the
witnesses, with its own interpretation of the facts. The standard required to compel such a
decision, however, is very high and, in this case, is not met.
The Utah Supreme Court recently reiterated the standard of review to be applied in
reviewing a jury verdict. In Billings v. Union Bankers Ins. Co., 918 P.2d 461 (Utah 1996),
the court stated that
[i]n reviewing a jury verdict, we view the evidence in the light most
supportive of the verdict, and assume that the jury believed those aspects
of the evidence which sustain its findings and judgment. Accordingly,
we will upset a jury verdict only upon a showing that the evidence so
clearly preponderates in favor of the appellant that reasonable people
would not differ on the outcome of the case.
Id. at 467 (citations omitted). This standard is a "well- established principal of appellate
review." Pratt v. Prodata. Inc.. 885 P.2d 786, 788 (Utah 1994).
It is likewise well-established that, "it is the prerogative of the jury to resolve
issues of fact," and that "accepted rules of appellate review preclude the appellate court from
substituting its judgment for that of the jury on issues of fact." E.A. Strout Western Realty
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v. W.C. Fov & Sons. 665 P.2d 1320, 1322 (Utah 1983). In reviewing a jury verdict the
appellate court must defer to the jury and
accept the evidentiary inferences that tend to support the verdict rather
than contrary inferences that support the appellants' version of the facts,
even if we might have judged those inferences differently had we been
deciding the matter in the first instance, and not as an appellate court.
Hodges v. Gibson Products Co.. 811 P.2d 151 (Utah 1991).
Accordingly, before this Court may overturn the jury's verdict, CIC must
demonstrate to the Court either that there was no evidence in support of the jury's unanimous
verdict (because the court must "accept that testimony which supports the jury's verdict"), or
that the evidence in support of the verdict "so clearly preponderates" in favor of CIC, "that
reasonable people could not differ" in finding for CIC.

Id at 156; Billings. 918 P.2d at

467.
Viewing the evidence and the inferences to be drawn from the evidence in a light
most supportive of the verdict, and accepting the jury's resolution of the facts and the
credibility of the evidence, this Court must affirm the jury's unanimous verdict on both
issues CIC raises on appeal. The evidence supports the jury's unanimous decision on both
issues, and does not so preponderate in CIC's favor that reasonable people could not differ in
finding for CIC.
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II.

THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE JURY'S VERDICT THAT THE
SIGGARDS TOOK THE STEPS NECESSARY TO FORFEIT CIC'S
INTEREST UNDER THE CONTRACT,
CIC argues that the Siggards' April 3, 1990 notice of CIC's failure to cure its

default was defective because it was received two days prior to the technical end of the cure
period. Because this second notice was two days early, CIC argues it should now be allowed
a new notice of default and a new opportunity to cure, six years after its default and after the
jury expressly rejected that remedy, and even though CIC has not appealed that finding.9
A.

The Evidence Demonstrated that CIC Received Appropriate Notice.

Under the default provisions of the Contract, the Siggards, if electing to end the
Contract and retain any payments already paid, were required first to provide written notice
of CIC's default, stating that CIC had defaulted and had thirty days in which to cure the
default. (Trial Ex. 7 f 18, Add. B.) Evidence was presented at trial, and it is an undisputed
fact in the Record, that the Siggards provided, and CIC received, such notice by letter dated
March 5, 1990 (Pretrial Order, R. 890, Add. K). The March 5, 1990 letter provided CIC
with (i) clear, unambiguous notice of CIC's default, (ii) notice of the time period in which
CIC had to cure its default, and (iii) notice of the Siggards' election of this specific remedy
(Trial Ex. 20, Add. F). Accordingly, the letter of March 5, 1990 gave CIC all the
substantive notice CIC was entitled to receive. Interestingly, in over six years since its
default, CIC has never asserted or argued that the March 5, 1990 default letter was

9

In its brief CIC states: "Buyer does not dispute . . . that Buyer is not entitled to
specifically enforce the contract." (Appellant's Brief, 15).
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confusing, ambiguous or misleading in any way. It was not. Indeed, the evidence at trial
demonstrated that CIC was fully aware of the March 5, 1990 default notice, its requirements
and CIC's obligations thereunder. (R. 1611, Tr. 166:21-25; R. 1633, Tr. 251:24-25,
252:1-2.)
That CIC understood the terms of the March 5, 1990 notice of default is clear.
Busch testified that he received and understood the March 5, 1990 notice. (R. 1633,
Tr. 252:7-10.) CIC knew it had an obligation to pay $56,000.00 on or before March 3,
1990- (R. 1614-1615, Tr. 178:24-25, 179:1-2.) The jury heard the testimony of Busch that,
despite receiving and understanding the March 5, 1990 notice, CIC made no attempt
whatsoever to make the required payment, to call or otherwise contact the Siggards to discuss
making the payment, or attempt in any way to tender a cure of CIC's default. (R. 1690,
Tr. 411:12-14.) Further, CIC knew that if it did not cure the default it would forfeit its
rights under the contract (R. 1610-1611, Tr. 162:20-25, 163:1-15), and that the notice was a
forfeiture notice. (R. 1611, Tr. 164:9-12.)
B.

The Evidence Demonstrated that the Early Notice to CIC Made No
Difference in CIC's Actions.

Under the terms of the contract, if CIC failed to cure its breach within the
specified thirty days, the Siggards would provide a second notice of CIC's failure to cure and
of the Siggards' election of the remedy terminating their obligations under the contract and
allowing them to retain any amounts paid prior to default. (Trial Ex. 7 f 18, Add. B.) The
second notice is a technical formality to finalize the substantive notice CIC previously
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received and understood. The second notice requirement did not confer upon CIC any new
benefit, the technical violation of which would cause harm to CIC in any manner. Indeed,
the second notice merely acknowledged that CIC's default remained uncured during the
required cure period and that further obligations between the parties under the contract were
terminated. The second notice did not preclude CIC from attempting to cure its breach by
tendering the $56,000.00 payment prior to the expiration of the 30 day cure period, and,
consequently, its delivery two days prior to the end of the cure period did not harm CIC.
CIC fully understood this, as Busch testified that even though the notice was two days early,
CIC still could have cured the default. (R. 1633, Tr. 252:7-10.)
Further, the jury received evidence that demonstrated that CIC had no intention of
paying the $56,000.00 payment on March 3, 1990 or at any time during the cure period.
(R. 1612, Tr. 167:12-25, 168:1.) The evidence showed that CIC sought to excuse its
payment (R. 1612, Tr. 167:22-25), and otherwise took every action to avoid payment, rather
than curing the default. (R. 1612, Tr. 167: 4-5.)
On April 3, 1990, CIC received the Siggards' second notice, informing CIC of its
failure to cure and of the Siggard's election of their remedy under the contract. (Trial Ex. 2,
Add. G.) The jury again heard testimony from Busch that, rather than attempt to cure CIC's
default by paying the amount which was then overdue, Busch delivered the second notice to
his lawyer and had his lawyer respond by way of the April 4, 1990, letter (R. 1612,
Tr. 167:4-5; Trial Ex. 23, Add. H.)

185112 2

25

The April 4, 1990 letter from CIC's counsel was CIC's only response to the
Siggards' notices and, tellingly, makes no reference to CIC's default or any intent to cure
that default by tendering the amount due. Nor does it state any excuse for failing to make
the payment. Instead, the April 4, 1990 letter claims the Siggards' notices were defective
because they were not signed by the Siggards in their capacity as Trustees, and that the
April 3, 1990 notice was two days early. (Trial Ex. 23; Add. H.)
In its silence on CIC's obligation to cure its default by paying the amount due, the
April 4, 1990 letter revealed much to the jury about CIC's intent toward the payment due on
the Siggards' property. While CIC knew its obligation to pay $56,000.00 was due on
March 3, 1990, CIC had repeatedly sought to avoid these annual interest payments.
(R. 1687, Tr. 399:8-17; R. 1688, Tr. 405:2-7; R. 1612, Tr. 167:6-14.) In March, 1989
when the very first payment was overdue, the Siggards had to provide CIC with a Notice of
Default before CIC ultimately paid the first delinquent payment. (R. 1687, Tr. 399:8-17.)
CIC made that payment grudgingly, and only after the Siggards had agreed to amend the
Contract. (R. 1687, Tr. 399:18-23.) CIC also sought to defer the March 3, 1990 payment.
(R. 1688, Tr. 405:2-7.) Even after receiving the April 3, 1990 Notice, CIC still sought to
change the arrangement or create a new one. Mr. Siggard testified at trial that between 30
and 60 days after CIC had not cured the default, CIC, through Busch, telephoned him and
stated that "now that you (the Siggards) have the property back what are you going to do
with it?" (R. 1690, Tr. 414:25; 415:1-7.) CIC, in that same conversation requested that
Siggards and CIC develop the property together as partners. (R. 1691, Tr. 415:15-19.) The
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evidence and the inferences a jury can draw from the evidence indicate that CIC never
intended to pay the March 3, 1990 installment and belatedly sought to use the excuse that a
survey had not been provided by the Siggards as the basis for its non-payment. (R. 1612,
Tr. 167:22-25; 168:1.) CIC simply chose to believe that it did not have to make the
payment to the Siggards (R. 1634, Tr. 257:1-11), and had no intention of making the
payment.
Most telling to the jury was the fact that CIC never made the $56,000.00 payment,
and never even tendered the payment. (R. 1612, Tr. 167:1-18.) Within a month or two
after the forfeiture, Busch acknowledged that the Siggards "had the property back" and
sought to enter into two new arrangements with them. (R. 1681, Tr. 415:1-25.) The letter
of April 4, 1990 was silent regarding payment or tender of payment. (Add. G.) That letter
provided a golden opportunity for CIC to assure the Siggards that they would be paid the
delinquent payment, but CIC did not attempt to cure its default in the two days remaining in
the cure period, nor at any time in the two years before CIC sued the Siggards for $1
million, nor in the next three years before this matter made its way to trial. (R. 1612,
Tr. 167:12-18.)
C.

The Evidence Demonstrated that the Purpose of Notice Had Been
Served.

The purpose of requiring notice of a party's default of a real estate contract is to
put the defaulting party on notice of what that party has failed to do, what he has to do to
cure the default, and to provide a reasonable time in which the defaulting party may cure.
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Where notice is not deficient in these areas, and the default remains uncured, forfeiture of
any payments under a contract is appropriate. CIC claims that, in order to effectuate a
forfeiture of a real estate contract, the forfeiting party must strictly comply with the notice
provisions of the contract. CIC misconstrues, however, the intent and purpose of the notice
requirement and ignores the distinction between substantive notice requirements and technical
delivery requirements.
The fact that CIC never attempted to tender a cure for its default distinguishes this
case from those cases CIC cites as support for its appeal. The distinction between
substantive and technical notice requirements and the necessity of actual tender of
performance, although ignored by CIC, is clear in the cases CIC cites in support of its
position. In Grow v. Marwick Dev. Inc.. 621 P.2d 1249 (Utah 1980), the sellers of real
property appealed the district court's ruling that the buyers had not forfeited their interest
under a uniform real estate contract. In that case, the sellers had sent two separate notices of
default to the buyers, one in May, the next in June. Sellers followed in July with a notice of
failure to cure the default and notice of forfeiture. In August, sellers sent a third notice of
default giving the buyers another 15 days to correct the delinquency. Within the 15 days,
buyers tendered a check for the delinquent amounts due, including interest. Two weeks
later, sellers sent a second notice of failure to cure default and notice of forfeiture and later
returned the earlier tendered payment. Id., 1251.
Instead of holding that the notice of forfeiture to buyers was insufficient due to
some technicality in delivery, as CIC argues in this case, the Grow court held that the notice
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was defective because, in light of the several earlier notices, the August notice led the buyers
to believe they had an extra 15 days to cure the default, a belief the buyers acted upon to
their detriment. After receiving two default notices, then a forfeiture notice, then a third
default notice granting more time to cure, the buyers in Grow were confused as to what the
seller's position was and what was required of them. For that reason, the court held that the
buyers were entitled to the additional 15 days to cure their default. Id., 1252. And since the
buyers made the payment within those 15 days, it was appropriate to conclude that the
buyer's interest had not been forfeited.
The Grow facts are nothing like the facts in this case. In Grow the confusing and
misleading nature of the notices made them defective; in this case, there was no substantive
defect with the content of the notices given to CIC. Rather, the Siggards' March 5, 1990
notice of default clearly stated that CIC was in default of its annual interest payment and that
CIC had 30 days to cure that default. Unlike sellers in Grow, the Siggards did not send
second or third notices of default, or grant additional trial to cure. Nor did they send CIC
conflicting signals as to their intentions. Rather, the Siggards gave CIC clear and
unambiguous notice of their intentions and, when no tender of a cure was made, the Siggards
affirmatively stated their intent to terminate the contract.
Unlike the buyers in Grow, despite receiving clear notice of default, CIC did not
tender a cure within the requisite cure period and made no attempt to offer such cure at any
time thereafter, not in the two days after the second notice, or ever. These facts distinguish
this case from Grow.

185112 2

29

Similarly distinguishable from this case is Adair v. Bracken. 745 P.2d 849 (Utah
App. 1987). In Adair, the seller's escrow agent advised buyers, who had paid over twothirds of the purchase price, of a delinquency in their payments. The agent's letter did not
mention the consequence of the buyers' failing to remit the past due amounts and did not
inform buyers of seller's intent to pursue contractual remedies. Id., 850. After the first
letter, neither the buyers nor the sellers did anything for five months. The escrow agent then
sent a second letter stating that "it [w]as the intent of the Sellers...to demand that [the buyer]
immediately arrange to pay off the entire balance" of the contract. Id. (Emphasis added.)
The second letter requested a response from buyers in five days and stated that if no response
was received, the sellers would exercise their contract option resulting in the forfeiture of the
amounts already paid. Id. Despite their five-day threat, the sellers, again, took no action
for several months, this time not until after the buyers had tendered the full amount of
principal and interest then owing. Id. Just as in Grow, the sellers in Adair refused to accept
the tender.
Noting that only one of the two requisite notices was provided and that the only
notice given "fatally omitted" essential substantive content, like the amount demanded, the
Adair court held that the notice provided to the buyers was insufficient to terminate their
contractual rights, particularly in light of the fact that sellers had tolerated several months of
non-payment. Id. 853. The court noted that, because of the conflicting notices and sellers'
acquiescence in buyers' non-payment, buyers "reasonably assumed their continued default
was being tolerated." Id.
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The Adair court did not find the notice defective based on a mere technicality, as
CIC would have this Court do. Rather, the notices in Grow and Adair were substantively
defective in their content. Those notices confused the buyers and omitted key substantive
details. Those substantively defective notices were then negated by the buyers' affirmative
showing of their intent to cure by their actual tendering of the full amount of delinquent
payments due. CIC never made such affirmative showing.
Again, the facts of this case are distinctly different from the facts in either Grow
or Adair. CIC received substantive notice of its default and of what was required to cure
that default. Despite that clear notice, and the later notice of the Siggards' intent to
terminate the contract, CIC, unlike the buyers in Grow and Adair, made no attempt
whatsoever to tender a cure. The evidence before the jury demonstrated that CIC did not
call or write to the Siggards, or in any way tender their delinquent payment at any time
between receipt of the March 5, 1990 and 28 days later when they received notice of the
Siggards' intent to terminate the contract. (Tr. 411:12-14.) The evidence further showed
that CIC made no tender of its delinquent payments in the two days following its receipt of
the Siggards' second notice. (Tr. 252: 7-10.)

The evidence and the inferences the jury can

draw from the evidence additionally demonstrated that CIC did not want to make the annual
payment (Tr. 167: 22-15, 168:1) and had twice, before the payment was due, attempted to
restructure the contract to eliminate the required annual payments. (Tr. 409:24-25, 410:1.)
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D*

CIC's Argument Places Form Over Substance.

Its argument, peeled down to its core, is that even if notice makes a defaulting
party aware of its default and its requirements to cure, and even though no confusion exists
on the part of the defaulting party, premature delivery of a later notice to inform the
defaulting party of what it already knew negates the substantive sufficiency of the earlier
notice, even where the defaulting party never tendered its cure within the cure period. Such
a position is indefensible and CIC has failed to cite a single case supporting such an absurd
conclusion. Such a rule would make bad law, inevitably leading to every defaulting party's
finding a technical default in delivery to excuse its, even intentional, failure to perform.
Several courts, however, have distinguished substantive notice requirements and technical
delivery requirements, holding that where notice actually puts the party on notice of his
default, a technical violation of a delivery requirement will not negate the effect of the
substantive notice.
Noting that "the law does not require a useless act that in no way would have
changed the notice actually given," the court in Kopp's Rug Co. v. Talbot. 620 P.2d 1167,
1170 (Kan. App. 1980), found that notice to homeowners of the filing of a lien on their
property provided the necessary substantive notice, and was upheld as adequate notice even
though delivery and service requirements of the lien statute were not strictly complied with.
In Hill v. Johnson. 713 P.2d 493 (Mem. Dec. Kan. 1985) the court sustained the
effectiveness of substantive, actual notice despite delivery not in accordance with contract
terms. The California Court of Appeals has also held that substantial compliance with
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default notice requirements in a property lease is sufficient. In that case, the court held that
a three day notice of termination of a lease was sufficient despite a contractual requirement
of five day notice, particularly in light of the fact that the lessees had made no attempt to
comply with earlier notices of default and had failed to cure the defaults. Id., 627.
Schulman v. Vera, 108 Cal. App. 3rd 552 (Cal. App. 4th Dist. 1980). The Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals, reviewing a case from the District of Utah, has likewise held that
substantial compliance with the notice provisions of a contract for the sale of mineral rights
was sufficient notice, despite technical defects in the way the notice was given and received.
Midwest Uranium Co. v. Craig, 215 F.2d 219, 221 (10th Cir. 1953).
CIC received the substantive notice it was entitled to receive in the March 5, 1990
notice of default. The second notice merely stated the fact that CIC had failed to cure its
default as required under the Contract. CIC was not harmed by the two-day early delivery
of that second notice. Busch even testified that CIC could have cured the default in the two
days remaining in the cure period if CIC had chosen to. (R. 1633, Tr. 252:7-10.) But CIC
did not cure its default. Instead, CIC had its lawyer record a Notice of Interest on the
Siggard's property and send the April 4, 1990 letter. (R. 1612, Tr. 167:4-11.) The
reasonable implication of this testimony and evidence is that CIC did not cure the default
(pay the money undisputedly due) because CIC did not want to, preferring to have its
lawyers tell the Siggards payment was not due because of some excuse. CIC's action, in the
face of default and forfeiture, clearly demonstrates CIC's purpose to preserve a benefit to
CIC, a continuing interest in the property of the contract, without paying for it, and relying
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on a pretextual excuse to justify its failure to perform. The April 4, 1990 letter from CIC's
attorney was calculated to provide just such a result: a pretextual excuse not to make the
payment CIC did not want to pay. The Siggards did not ask for a letter of excuses; the
Siggards asked CIC to merely do that which it was obligated to do—make the March 3, 1990
payment or lose its right to any interest in the Contract.
The jury saw through CIC's charade. It weighed the evidence and unanimously
determined that the Siggards did what was required to put CIC on notice of its obligation to
cure and the resultant consequence. The jury heard no evidence that CIC wanted to do
something to cure its default; it heard only CIC's excuses to justify its default. CIC's actions
are akin to the old adage that "you can lead a horse to water, but you can't make it drink."
CIC was on notice of its obligations to cure its default, and refused to correct it. The
excuses CIC concocted to beg off its performance were neither compelling to the jury, or to
the judge. This evidence supports the jury's verdict against CIC, and, accordingly, the jury's
verdict should be affirmed.
E.

CIC Seeks the Relief on Appeal the Jury Unanimously Rejected.

As relief for its appeal, CIC unbelievably requests that it be given "a new notice of
default and a new opportunity to cure." (Appellant's Brief, 29.) Simply put, CIC requests a
remedy that the jury expressly rejected, and relief that CIC acknowledges it is not entitled to
receive. (Appellant's Brief, 15.) To ask for this relief now, when CIC has not appealed the
jury's denial of specific performance, is tantamount to asking this court to reinstate the
Contract as if there had been no default, as if the six year dispute between these parties
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never occurred, as if the world had stopped to hold its collective breath to see if CIC's
excuses would work, and thereby allow CIC to make the payment it chose not to make on
April 3, 1990. CIC's request ignores CIC's pre-trial election of specific performance as its
sole remedy at trial. More importantly, it ignores the jury's verdict and the fact CIC did not
appeal that verdict. CIC cannot have it both ways. Specific performance by any other name
is still specific performance. That remedy was unanimously rejected by the jury and has not
been appealed. CIC is asking the Court for a remedy that is wholly inconsistent with its
prior decisions, the jury's verdict and the issues actually appealed.
III.

THE JURY'S VERDICT THAT CIC VIOLATED THE WRONGFUL LIEN
STATUTE IS SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE.
Under the Utah Wrongful Lien Statute, a lien recorded against real property

violates the statute if it is "groundless." No Utah court has defined the term, but the Arizona
Court of Appeals has defined a groundless lien as one either "without arguable basis" or "not
supported by credible evidence." Evergreen West, Inc. v. Boyd, 810 P.2d 612 (Ariz. App.
1991). In this case, Judge Iwasaki instructed the jury on this point of law. (R. 1017, Jury
Ins. 43.) On appeal, CIC has focused its argument on the "arguable basis" test of the
groundlessness of its lien. It is apparent from the record, however, that the jury applied the
"not supported by credible evidence" test in finding CIC's notice of interest groundless.
Whether the recording of a lien is arguable or supported by credible evidence is a
question of fact for the jury to decide. Coventry Homes, Inc. v. Scottscom Partnership, 155
Ariz. 215, 745 P.2d 962, 966 (Ariz. App. 1987). It is the "prerogative of the jury to resolve
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issues of fact" (Jury Ins. 6, R. 981) and to weigh the credibility of evidence. E.A. Strout
Western Realty v. W.C. Fov & Sons, 665 P.2d 1320 (Utah 1983). (R. 981, Jury Ins. 6;
R. 985, Jury Ins. 10.) While the jury heard CIC's "arguable basis" argument, in light of the
other evidence presented at trial, the jury apparently did not find CIC's arguable basis theory
credible. Rather, the jury was persuaded that there was no credible evidence supporting the
lien on the Siggards' property, particularly in light of substantial evidence showing that
i) CIC wanted out of its contract obligations at the time CIC filed its notice of interest,
ii) CIC had no intention of developing any of the property except those acres closest to the
intersection, and that iii) CIC's argument for not designating the property it wanted to
develop was a pretext.
Substantial evidence, in addition to that cited by CIC, supports the jury's verdict:
1.

The Contract, as amended, restricted CIC to the purchase of 16

acres of the 38-acre parcel (Trial Ex. 17, Add. D);
2.

In April, 1988, CIC submitted a legal description for the 18 acres in

the northwestern-most corner of the Siggards' 38-acre parcel closest to 11400
South and 1000 East as the property CIC intended to develop and for which it
sought commercial zoning (R. 1738, Tr. 605:7-19; Trial Exs. 3, 29);
3.

In November, 1988 CIC submitted a second legal description to

Sandy City which again described the 16 acres in the northwestern-most corner,
closest to the intersection of 11400 South and 1000 East, as the property CIC
intended to develop (R. 1738, Tr. 605:20-25, 606:1-10; Trial Exs. 8, 29);

185112 2

36

4.

Pursuant to CIC's request, Sandy City approved, first in January

1989 and finally in August 1989, commercial zoning for 13 acres of the Siggard's
38 acre parcel, which 13 acres are in the northwestern-most corner of the parcel
closest to 11400 South and 1000 East, in the very location CIC had proposed to
build its commercial development (R. 1739, Tr. 608:11-19, Trial Exs. 14, 29);
5.

CIC had possession of the legal description of the commercially

zoned portion of the Siggards' property as early as January 1989 and could have
therefore easily limited its Notice of Interest to those acres CIC had an interest in
developing (Trial Ex. 13);
6.

Throughout the entire period CIC was involved with the proposed

development project CIC always intended to locate its project on the northwest
corner of the Siggard's property closest to 11400 South and 1000 East (R. 1738,
Tr. 605:7-25, 606:1-10, Trial Exs. 3, 8, 13, 14, 29);
7.

CIC filed the Notice of Interest one day prior to the forfeiture of

CIC's interest in the Property (Trial Ex. 22);
8.

CIC, through Busch, acknowledged after forfeiture that the Property

was the Siggards', and sought to create a new agreement with them (R. 1691, Tr.
415:1-25);
9.

Even at the date of trial, CIC still refused to designate the property

it desired to purchase; and
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10.

CIC never informed the Siggards that it had filed a Notice of

Interest on their property, nor did CIC ever provide the Siggards a copy of the
Notice of Interest (R. 1692, Tr. 419:10-22);
11.

In September, 1992, after CIC filed the lawsuit and two years after

CIC had recorded the Notice of Interest, when the Siggards first discovered the
lien, CIC refused to release the lien despite the Siggard's demand. (Trial Ex. 43,
Add. O.)
This evidence, and the inferences the jury can draw from this evidence, support the
jury's verdict that the lien was groundless. Additionally, the jury heard evidence that, as of
the expiration of the thirty days to cure, on April 5, 1990, all of CIC's right and interest in
the Property had been forfeited. The retention of a lien on property for which CIC had no
legal right, which it had lost by its own failure to cure its known default, made the lien
groundless.
At trial, CIC attempted to convince the jury that it could not designate the property
it wanted because it did not have a survey from the Siggards. The jury had evidence that
this claim was pretextual and ruled against CIC. Viewing the evidence "in the light most
supportive of the verdict," and deferring to the jury's determination of the credibility of the
evidence and questions of fact, it is clear that the jury found no credible evidence supporting
CIC's recording its lien over the Siggard's entire 38 acre parcel. The evidence presented at
trial did not "so clearly preponderate" in favor of CIC so as to require the setting aside of
the jury's unanimous verdict.

185112 2

38

A.

The Verdict Is Not Against the Law.

As if the factual evidence were not enough to sustain the jury's verdict, the law as
set forth in the jury instructions and ultimately applied by the jury, also favors the jury's
determination that CIC violated the wrongful lien statute. In Bianco v. Patterson, 768 P.2d
204 (Ariz. App. 1989), the Arizona Court of Appeals upheld a lower court's ruling that a
lien was groundless on facts very similar to the facts of this case. In Bianco, the purchaser
of real property filed a lis pendens against the seller's entire 1800 acres, despite the
contract's limiting the purchaser's interest to a designated 40-acre parcel. The Arizona Court
of Appeals found that the lis pendens should have covered only the 40-acre parcel, even
though the purchaser had a contractual right to purchase a greater portion of the property.
Id., 206. The mere fact that a party may have a contractual right does not give that party an
"arguable" basis to file a lien on portions of the property in which the purchaser has no
interest.
Similar to the facts in Bianco, CIC recorded a lien on property it was not entitled
to purchase under the Contract. The evidence showed CIC knew the acres it desired to
purchase, and had no intention of purchasing or developing the remainder. Although the
right to designate the acres it wanted became a convenient excuse for its wrongful lien, the
jury saw past the ruse and found the other evidence credible.
The jury, properly instructed in the law, and after reviewing the facts of this case,
rejected CIC's arguments, as was its prerogative. The jury did not reach the wrong decision.
The jury heard evidence from both parties and, judging the credibility of that evidence as
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instructed by the court, unanimously found that CIC's lien on the Siggards' 38 acre parcel
was in violation of the Utah Wrongful Lien Statute. The unanimous nature of the jury's
decision suggests that the evidence CIC presented at trial did not "so clearly preponderate" in
favor of CIC that reasonable people would not differ in finding for CIC. In fact, they found
just the opposite; they did not differ in finding for the Siggards. The evidence at trial,
especially when viewed in light "most supportive of the verdict" should be affirmed on this
appeal.

CONCLUSION
CIC has not met its burden of showing that the evidence presented at trial so
clearly preponderates in CIC's favor that reasonable people could not disagree in finding for
CIC. On its face, and particularly in a light most favoring the verdict, the evidence on both
issues appealed abundantly supports the jury's verdict. The verdict should therefore stand
and CIC's appeal should be dismissed.
Respectfully submitted this 7th day of October, 1996.
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK &
MCDONOUGH

Randall N. Skanchy
Scott D. Cheney
Attorneys for Don and Glenna F. Siggard
as Trustees of the Don and Glenna F.
Siggard Family Trust
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I certify that on the 7th day of October, 1996, I caused to be hand delivered, two
copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellee to:
James L. Christensen
Mark J. Morrise
CORBRIDGE BAIRD & CHRISTENSEN
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant
39 Exchange Place, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK &
MCDONOUGH

Randall N. Skanchy, _ >
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ADDENDUM

ADDENDUM
Several of the documents included in this addendum are also included in the
Addendum to Appellant's Brief. They are included here for convenience off the court. In
this Addendum, each document is separately lettered. The corresponding Trial Exhibit
Number or citation to document in the record is noted where applicable:
Addendum

Description

Trial Exhibit/Record

A.

Earnest Money Agreement

Tr. Ex. 1

B.

Real Estate Contract - August 1988

Tr. Ex. 7

C.

Letter Notice of Default from Siggard
to CIC March 6, 1989

Tr. Ex. 16

D.

Amendment to Real Estate Contract March 30, 1989

Tr. Ex. 17

E.

Annual Interest Payment - Check Stub

Tr. Ex. 18

F.

March 5, 1990 Notice of Default
Letter

Tr. Ex. 20

G.

April 3, 1990 Notice of Termination
of Contract

Tr. Ex. 21

H.

April 4, 1990 Counsel's Letter to

Tr. Ex. 23

I.

Siggards
Notice of Interest

Tr. Ex. 22

J.

Letter from Michael Aldrich
December 7, 1993

Tr. Ex. 27

K.

Pre-Trial Order

R. 882-100

L.

Special Verdict

R. 1023-1025

M.

Judgment Dated August 18, 1995

R. 1064-1067

N.

Order Denying Plaintiffs Motion for
New Trial

O.

Letter demanding Release of Lien
September 8, 1992

Tr. Ex. 43

P.

Order Awarding Judgment Against
CIC for Attorneys Fees and Costs,
dated November 9, 1995

R. 1291-1295

R. 1288 - 1290

Tab A

:

Yes<X)

EARNEST M O N E Y RECEIKI

Not.0)

DATE

Busch C o r p o r a t i o n

Hie undersigned Buyer _

Five

flNEST M O N E Y , the amount of
•rm of

a promissory

and/or

Thousand and

March

3.

\988

assigns

, hereby deposits w.ih Brokerage

No/100

_

note

Dollars <$

5.000.00

. which shall be deposited m accordance with applicable State La*
N/A

Received by
Phone Number

OFFER TO P U R C H A S E

PROPERTY DESCRIPTION

The above stated EARNEST M O N E Y is given to secure and apply on the pur
Sandy
S a l t Lake
m the City of .
. County of
Utah.
Eject to any restrictive covenants, zoning regulations utility or other easements or rights of way. government patents or state deeds of record approved by Buyer
Accordance with Section G Said property .s more particularly described as.
S o u t h e a s t c o r n e r o f 11400 South 1000 E a s t , Sandy, Utah
1

hnOO
IJOOO

East,

Sandy,

ftpfl£QXimatQlv

20+

Utah

acres

(to

be

zoned c o m m e r c i a l ) .

_ _ _ .

[CHECK APPLICABLE 8 0 X E S
• fj U N I M P R O V E D REAL P R O P E R T Y
0 I M P R O V E D REAL P R O P E R T Y
(a)

I n c l u d e d items.

D Vacant Lot
Q Commercial

23 Vacant Acreage
Q Residential

Q Other
Q Condo

Q Other

Unless excluded below, this sale shall include all fixtures and any of the items shown m Section A if presently anached to the property
None

The following personal property shall also be included in this sale and conveyed under separate Bill of Sale with warranties as to title

(b)

J[c)

Excluded items.

C O N N E C T I O N S . U T I L I T I E S A N O OTHER R I G H T S .

^Dpublic sewer
0septic tank

None

The following items are specifically excluded from this sale

Oconnected

Seller represents that the property includes the following improvements in the purchase pnce

Dwell
O connected
Q other
Q irrigation water / secondary system

Q connected

« of shares
Q TV antenna

Q master antenna

Qpnvate water

S t a t u r a l gas

G connected

Survey

condition, except

2.

. ^ d e d i c a t e d road

No e x c e p t i o n s

P U R C H A S E PRICE A N D F I N A N C I N G .

p o t h e r rights

The total purchase price for the property is

*

S33.QQO

POT a g r g

<?9ne^

-o-

' Soe Above

commercial)

. ) which shall be paid as follows

representing the approximate balance of an existing mortgage, trust deed note, reei estate contract or other encumbrance to be assumed

0 principal.

Q interest;

% per annum with monthly payments of * -

O taxes;

O insurance;

Q c o n d o fees:

O other

representing the approximate balance of an additional existing mortgage, trust deed note, real estate contract or other encumbrances to be
assumed by Buyer, which obligation bears interest at

L

Seller

representing the approximate balance of C A S H D O W N P A Y M E N T at dosing.

which include:

-0-

by

which represents the aforedescrtbed EARNEST M O N E Y DEPOSIT:

which include:

!

«-^<f

now h e l d

; >

by buyer, which obligation bears interest at

-0-

any

prior to closing, O shall not be furnished

. Dollars (•

-0-

^ J \ Q

Buyer has made a visual inspection of the properly and subject to Section 1 (c) above and 6 below, accepts >: m its present physical

L
s.ooo.no
ifl.ono.flo

Cpaved

r / <pcurb and gutter A)cft**-

Q prewired

Seller

A certified survey G3sh
a shall be furnished at the expense of .

Buyer Inspection.

D connected

Q ingress & egress by private easement

Company .

0other sanitary system
^ p u b l i c water
Q connected
O connected

^electricity

Oprincipal

D interest:

Otaxes;

% per annum with monthly payments of %
Q insurance.

O c o n d o fees;

Oother

Sale to close on a ten
year Trust Deed and Note with IPS annual Interest payments commencing one year fro* the date this
agreement Is accepted by Seller. Seller to release requested acreage to Buyer for 135,000 per
acre. Closing to take place within 30 days of commercial zoning and site plan approval by
0lher
Sandy City. This offer will terminate If Buyer and Seller agree that there is no commercial zoning
TOTAL PURCHASE PRICE
availability on said property. Buyer will identify approximate boundaries of
the proposed commercial zoning on or before June 3, 1988.
representing balance, if any. including proceeds from a new

. loan, to be paid as follows

ff Buyer is required to assume an underlying obligation a n d ' or obtain outside financing. Buyer agrees to use best efforts to assume and/or procure same and this
r *$ made subject to 8uyer qualifying for and lending institution granting said assumption and / o r financing Buyer agrees to make application within
Rafter Seller s acceptance of this Agreement, to assume the underlying obligation a n d / o r obtain the new financing at an interest rate not to exceed
W * r does not qualify for the assumption a n d / o r financing within
an of the Buyer or Seller upon written notice

"/A

L
'

agrees to pay $
towards Buyer s total financing and closing costs, including but not limited to. loan discount points
1thi$ Agreement involves the assumption of an existing loan or obligation on the property. Section f shall apply

&• hvo of a four p t y e form

\

Seller's Initials

%

days after Seller $ acceptance of this Agreement, this Agreement shall be voidable

Buyer's Initial

Oate

3/s

e n t w , t n a n at,

aht -

o f n e y s opinion (?

ecnon H)

PACTION OF TITLE. In accordance w i * Section G. Buyer shall have the opportunity to inspect the title to the subiect property D r l 0 r
oke Mle subject to any existing restrictive covenants. >nc)ud»ng condominium resincuons (CC & Rs) Suyer O has Q has not r e v . ^ l ^ * „
W any
[ 4 B s pnor to signing th.s Agreement
ISTING OF TITLE.

Title shall vest tn Buyer as follows

;LLE R WARRANTIES.

^ t 0 the above and Section C shall be limited to the following

^ pnor to closing
rnaduavs.

No o t h e r

No e x c e p t i o n s

This offer is made subject to the followmg special conditions and/or contingencies which must

Proper commercial zoning for s t r i p shopping center. Proper access to e x i s t i n g u t i l i t y
Buyer**

approval o f survey

C9
do-

As d i r e c t e d a t c l o s i n g

In addition to warranties contained in Section C. the following .terns are also warranted

peClAL CONSIDERATIONS AND CONTINGENCIES.

con

and s o i l s

?nH

fost.

ROSING OF SALE. This Agreement shall be closed on or before
March 3
19 89
at a reasonable location to be designated by
^ c t to Section Q Upon demand Buyer shall deposit with the Escrow Closing Office all documents necessary to complete the ourchase m accordance
Agreement Prorations set forth m Section R. shall be made as of G date of possession % date of closing Q other

POSSESSION.

Seller shall deliver possession to Buyer on a c r e s * as p a i d o f f

GENERAL PROVISIONS/
pi by reference

extended by written agreement of pan.es

Unless otherwise indicated above, the General Provision Sections on the reverse side hereof are incorporated into this

AGREEMENT TO PUR

A^CCEPTANCE.

5:00
of Buyer

unless

Buyer offers to purchase the property on the above terms and conditions Seller

to accept this offer Unless accepted, this offer shall lapse and the Agent shall ieturn the

BttSerT

ndrew J . W a l t o n

Date

Signature of Buyer

Date

•TANCE OF OFFER TO PURCHASE Seller hereby ACCEPTS the foregoing offer on the terms and conditions specified above
BTfON Seller hereby REJECTS the foregoing offer

(Seller s Initials)

f£R OFFER Seller hereby accepts the foregoing offer SU8JECT TO the exceptions or modifications as specified below or in the anached Addendum and
i said COUNTER OFFER for Buyer s acceptance Buyar shall have until
I below

Signature of Seller

v

{A.M./P.M.)

. 19

to accept the terms

Signature of Seller

Opy/a&Qgart

p accepts the counter offer
ir accepts with modifications on attached addendum
(AM-PM)
MMISSION

The undersigned hereby agrees to pay to:

Lssion of

*lh.

Signature of Buyer

Signature of Buyer
N/A

(Brokerage)
. as consideration for the efforts m procuring a buyer

_

Oate

jre of Seller

1

N/A
Signature of Seller

' ''
Oate

OOCUMENT RECEIPT

Law requires Broker to furnish 8uyer and Seller with copies of this Agreement bearing ai/ygnaturcs (One of the following alternatives must therefore
Ipfeted)
I I acknowledge receipt of a final copy of the foregoing Agreement bearing all signatures

ruRE0FS £R
*-,

*

5^^-

^j^~

jJr

SIGNATUR
SUSCH

;A/ar

MM/fMStMM
J . WafttA

Oate

•^"'Andrew
IL^Twl

Oate

3' personally caused a final copy of the foregoing
g Agreement bearing all signatures to be mailed nn/
d Man and return receipt attached hereto to the O
3 Seller Q Buyei Sent by
|»ree of a four page form

^ Seller s Initials (Q&% ) i/Hy,

Data ^>/**/^O

/

Oate
Oate

ifrjfa19.

\-JBuyer's Initials

n... 3.A/&

bv

EARNf H" MONEY SALES AGR ".MENT
Legend
This is a legally binding contract

Yes (X)

No (0)

Read the entire document carefully before signing

REALTOR1

GENERAL PROVISIONS
(Sections)
INCLUDED ITEMS
Unless excluded herein this sale shall include all fixtures and any of the following items if presently attached to the property plumbing
jir-conditionmg and ventilating fixtures and equipment water heater built m appliances light fixtures and bulbs bathroom fixtures curtains and drapene4
L window and door screens storm doors window blinds awnings installed television antenna wail to wall carpets water softener automatic garage doo
and transmitters) fencing trees and shrubs
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^INSPECTION
Unless otherwise indicated Buyer agrees thai Buyer is purchasing said property upon Buyer s own examination and judgment and not b<
f y any representation madt to Buyer by Seller or the Listing or Selling Brokerage as to its condition size location present value future value mcomi
L or as to its production Buyer accepts the property m as is condition subject to Seller s warranties as outlined »n Section 6 In the event Buyer desire
pnonaJ inspection said inspection shall be allowed by Seller but arranged for and paid by Buyer

f
rSCLLER WARRANTIES
Seller warrants thai (a) Seller has received no claim nor notice of any building or toning violation concerning the property whici
I or will not be remedied prior to closing (b) all obligations against the property including taxes assessments mortgages liens or other encumbrance
liture shall be brought current on or before closing, and (c) the plumbing heating air conditioning and ventilating systems electrical system and appliance
[sound or in satisfactory working condition at closing
CONDITION OF WELL Seller warrants thai any private well serving the property has to the best of Sellers knowledge provided an adequate supply c
" continued use of the well or wells is authonied by • state permit or other legal water right

f

INDITION OF SEPTIC TANK
Seller warrants that any septic tank serving the property is to the best of Seller s knowledge in good working order an
no knowledge of any netdad repairs and it meets all applicable government health and construction standards

F

ACCELERATION CLAUSE No later than fifteen (15) days after Seller s acceptance of this Agreement but not less than three (3) days prior to closm<
jhell provide to Buyer written verification as to whether or not any notes, mongages deeds of trust or reef estate contracts against the property require it
I of the holder of such instrument(s) to the safe of the property or permit the holder to raise the interest rate and/or declare the entire balance due m tr
jf sale If any such document so provides and holder does not waive the same or unconditionally approve the sale then within three (3) days after notice i
iver or disapproval or on the date of dosing, whichever is earlier Buyer shall have the option to dedare this Agreement null and void by giving written notu
w or Seller s agent in such case ail earnest money received under this Agreement shall be returned to Buyer It is understood and agreed that if provtstor
I Due on Sale clause are set forth in Section 7 herstn. alternatives allowed herein shall become null and void

TITLE INSPECTION
No later then fifteen (15) days after Seller s acceptance of this Agreement but not less than three (3) days prior to closing Buy
•ve the opportunity to inspect either an abstract of title brought current with an attorney s opinion or a preliminary title report on the subject propert
shall have a period of three (3) days after receipt thereof to examine and accept If Buyer does not accept Buyer shall give written notice thereof to Sell
fc*s agent within the prescribed time period specifying objections to title Thereafter Seller shall be required through escrow at closing to cure ti
jti to which Buyer has obiected if said defect(s) is not curable through an escrow agreement at closing, this Agreement shall be null and void at the optu
Buyer and all monies received herewith shall be returned to the respective parties
TITLE INSURANCE
If title insurance is elected Seller authorizes the Listing Brokerage to order a preliminary commitment for a standard form ALl
of title insurance to be issued by such title insurance company as Seller shall designate Title policy to be issued shall contain no exceptions other th
provided for m sa<d standard form and the encumbrances or defects excepted under the final contract of sale If title cannot be made so insurable throuc
row agreement at dosing the earnest money shall unless Buyer elects to waive such defects or encumbrances be refunded to Buyer and this Agreeme
Mreupon be terminated Seller agrees to pay any cancellation charge

LEXISTING TENANT LEASES

If Buyer is to take title subject to an existing lease or leases Seller agrees to provide to Buyer no later than fifteen (15) da
•Iter s acceptance of this Agreement but not less than three (3) days prior to closing a copy of all existing leases (and any amendments thereto) affecti
oeny Unless written objection is given by Buyer to Seller or Seller s agent within three (3) working days thereafter Buyer shall take title subject to su
f objection is not remedied within the stated time this Agreement shall be null and void
CHANGES OURING TRANSACTION
During the pendency of this Agreement Seller agrees that no changes m any existing leases shall be made n
>ses entered mto nor shall any substantial alterations or improvements be made or undertaken without the written consent of the Buyer

\
ONE OF A FOUR PAGE FORM

^ 0 R , T Y ®* SIGNATORS
if Buyer or Seller is a corporation partnership trust estate or other entity the person executing th s Agreement on itj
«nts h s or her authority to do so and to b»nd Buyer or Seller
j|pl£TE AGREEMENT — NO VER8AL AGREEMENTS
This instrument constitutes the entire Agreement between the parties and supersedes and
Jjnd a" P r , 0 f negotiations representations warranties understandings or agreements between the part.es There are no verbal agreements which modify
, agreement This Agreement cannot be changed except by mutual written agreement of the parties
^ N T E R OFFERS
Any counter offer made by Seller or Buyer shall be m writing and if attached hereto shall incorporate all the provisions of this
Waal e*Pressly modified or excluded therein
:/UJLT/INTERPLEADER AND ATTORNEY S FEES
In the event of default by Buyer Seller may elect to either retain the earnest money as liquidated
w institute suit to enforce any rights of Seller In the event of default by Seller or if this sale fails to close because of the nonsatisfaction of any
jiUon or contingency to which the sale is subject pursuant to this Agreement (other than by virtue of any default by Buyer) the earnest money deposit
irned to Buyer Both parties agree that should either party default in any of the covenants or agreements herein contained the defaulting party shall
j and expenses including a reasonable attorney s fee which may arise or accrue from enforcing or terminating this Agreement or m pursuing any
,ded hereunder or by applicable law whether such remedy is pursued by filing suit or otherwise In the event the principal broker holding the earnest
^t is required to file an interpleader action in court to resolve a dispute over the earnest money deposit referred to herein the Buyer and Seller
r principal broker to draw from the earnest money deposit an amount necessary to advance the costs of bringing the interpleader action The amount
Rgrnainmg after advancing those costs shall be interpleaded into court in accordance with state law The Buyer and Seller further agree that the defaulting
R j y the court costs and reasonable attorney s fees incurred by the principal broker in bringing such action
MOGATION

Execution of a final real estate contract if any shall abrogate this Agreement

Sj( OF LOSS
All risk of loss or damage to the property shall be borne by the Seller until closing In the event there <s loss or damage to the property
date hereof and the date of closing by reason of fire vandalism flood earthquake or acts of God and the cost to repair such damage shall exceed
(10%) of the purchase price of the property 8uyer may at his option either proceed with this transaction if Seller agrees in writing to repair or
Inaged property prior to closing or declare this Agreement null and void If damage to property is less than ten percent (10%) of the purchase price
agrees m writing to repair or replace and does actually repair and replace damaged property prior to closing this transaction shall proceed as agreed

j
PIE IS OF ESSENCE—UNAVOIOA8LE DELAY
In the event that this sale cannot be closed by the date provided herein due to interruption of transport
flood extreme weather governmental regulations acts of God or similar occurrences beyond the control of Buyer or Seller then the closing date shall
[d seven (7) days beyond cessation of such condition but in no event more than thirty (30) days beyond the dosing date provided herein Thereafter
ma essence This provision relates only to the extension of closing date Closing shall mean the date on which all necessary instruments ara signed
by ail parties to the transaction
LOSING COSTS. Seller and Buyer shall each pay one-haH (1 / 2 ) of the escrow closing fee unless otherwise required by the lending institution Costs
(g title insurance or an abstract brought current shall be paid by Seller Taxes and assessments for the current year insurance if acceptable to the Buyer
merest on assumed obligations shall be prorated as set forth in Section 8 Unearned deposits on tenancies and remaining mortgage or other reserves
igned to Buyer at closing
, PROPERTY CONVEYANCING
If this agreement is for conveyance of fee title title shall be conveyed by warranty deed free of defects other than
xed herein If this Agreement is for sale or transfer of a Seller s interest under an existing real estate contract Seller may transfer by either (a) special
containing Seller s assignment of said contract in form sufficient to convey after acquired title or (b) by a new real estate contract incorporating the
Ml estate contract therein
fsENCY DISCLOSURE.
OKERAGE
DAYS

Selling Brokerage may have entered into an agreement to represent the Seller

For purposes of this Agreement any references to the term

For purposes of this Agreement, any references to the term

OUR OF A FOUR PAGE FORM.

Brokerage

shall mean the respective listing or selling reel estate office

days shall mean business or working days exclusive of legal holidays

THIS FORM HAS BEEN APPROVED BY THE UTAH REAL ESTATE COMMISSION

TabB

ss.

REAL ESTATE CONTRACT

^d?

This Contract is made and entered into this
day of
'^<A-M^y, 1988 by and between Don Siggard and Glenna F. Siggard,
, / Trustees ("Sellers"), whose address is 3318 Oakcliff Drive,
Jk/ Holladay, Utah 84124 and Commercial Investment Corporation, a
Utah corporation ("Buyer"), whose address is 5250 South 300 West,
Suite 100, Murray, Utah 84107.
RECITALS:
A.
On March 3, 1988, Sellers and Busch Corporation and/or
assigns entered into an Earnest Money Sales Agreement for the
purchase of approximately 20 acres real property to be zoned
commercial.
Busch Corporation has assigned all of its right,
title and interest in the Earnest Money Sales Agreement to Buyer.
8.
Pursuant to the terms of the Earnest Money Sales
Agreement, Buyer has no obligation to close until: (1) Sandy City
has approved Buyer's site plan and commercial zoning; (2) Buyer
has verified proper access to existing utilities and public
roadways: and (3) Buyer has approved the survey.
NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of the premises, the mutual
promises contained herein and other good and valuable
consideration, the receipt and sufficiency of which are hereby
acknowledged, the parties agree as follows:
1.
Property.
Sellers agree to sell and Buyer agrees to
buy approximately 20 acres of
real property (the "Property")
located at the southeast corner of 11400 South 1000 East, in the
City of Sandy, County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, which Property
is part of:
The Northwest Quarter of the Southeast
Quarter of Section 20, Township 3 South,
Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian,
excepting therefrom the following: Beginning
North 0#07f30" West 1327.82 feet from the
South quarter corner of said Section 20; and
running thence North 0*07f30" West 180.84
feet; thence North 89°52'30" East 456 feet;
thence South 0°07f30" East 183.58 feet more
or less; thence North 89•46f51" West 456 feet
more or less to the point of beginning.
Buyer shall have the exclusive right to identify the boundaries
of the Property it is purchasing which boundaries shall not
exceed the boundaries delineated on Exhibit "A." Buyer agrees
that it will not purchase property and identify boundaries
thereto which encompass all of the frontage to the property along
11400 South; Sellers shall retain sufficient frontage on 11400
South to have direct access to its proposed residential
development as set forth on the Crescent Village Community

Shopping Center Site Plan, a copy of which is attached hereto as
Exhibit A.
2.

Price and Payment.

A.
Buyer agrees to pay Sellers for the Property the
purchase price of Thirty Five Thousand Dollars ($35,000.00) per
acre payable at Sellers' address above given, or Sellers' order
on the following terms:
Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000.00) ("Down
Payment"), receipt of which is hereby
acknowledged; and Buyer shall pay annual
interest payments beginning March 3, 1989 and
continuing on the 3rd day of each March
thereafter until March 3, 1998 at which time
the entire unpaid principal balance together
with accrued interest shall be paid in full.
^
Interest shall accrue on the unpaid balance
at the rate of ten percent (10%) per annum.
,^Sy
Interest to accrue from March 3, 1988.
B.
The parties agree to deposit the Down Payment with
Lvanc3mark Title Company and hereby instruct Landmark Title Company
to deposit the Down Payment in its interest bearing Trust
Account. The Down Payment, with the accrued interest, shall be
disbursed to Sellers upon the execution of a Trust Deed and Note
and Warranty Deed as required by Paragraph 3 below. In the event
Buyer duly rescinds this Contract, then the principal of the Down
Payment shall be returned to Buyer and the interest accrued
thereon shall be paid to Sellers.
C.
The Installment Note in the amount of $5,000.00,
which was attached to the Earnest Money Sales Agreement as part
of the Down Payment, is hereby cancelled.
3.
Merger of Contract Into Deed and Trust Deed and Note.
Within forty-five (45) days after Buyer obtains from Sandy City
the commercial zoning and site plan approval for the Property,
the parties agree to terminate this Contract and merge this
Contract into a Warranty Deed, Trust Deed and Note. Buyer shall
execute and deliver to Sellers a Trust Deed and Note and Sellers
shall execute and deliver to Buyer a Warranty Deed. Buyer shall
give Sellers written notice so that parties can select a mutually
convenient date for the termination of this Contract and
execution o£ the Warranty Deed, Trust Deed, and Note. Copies of
the Warranty Deed, Trust Deed and Note are attached hereto as
Exhibits "B", "C" and "D" respectively and by this reference made
a part hereof.
4.
Partial Releases. Sellers agree to partially release
their security interest in the Property and convey a Warranty
Deed to Buyer for such released property upon payment under this
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Contract of $35,000.00 towards principal per acre- Sellers agree
to execute such releases and warranty deeds at the request of
Buyer,
Buyer may make such request at any such time as any
principal payments are made,
5.
Date of Possession. Sellers agree to deliver to Buyer
possession and Buyer agrees to enter into possession of each acre
of the Property upon merger of this Contract into Deed, Trust
Deed, and Note as set forth in Paragraph 3 above.
6.
Risk of Loss. All risk of loss and destruction of the
Property shall be borne by Sellers until Buyers take possession
of the Property.
7.
Conveyance of Title.
Sellers, on receiving the
payments herein reserved to be paid at the time and in the manner
specified herein, agree to execute and deliver to Buyer, or its
assigns, a good and sufficient warranty deed conveying the title
to the Property free and clear of all encumbrances except those
which have accrued by or through the acts or neglect of Buyer and
subject to the exceptions to title that are contained in the
Commitment described in Section 8.
8.
Evidence of Title. Sellers shall provide Buyer with a
Preliminary Commitment for Title Insurance ("Commitment'1) on the
Property at the time of or prior to execution of this Contract.
Sellers shall, at their expense and upon execution of the
documents described in paragraph 3 above, furnish Buyer evidence
of marketable title in the form of an Owner's Title Insurance
Policy ("Title Policy") insuring Buyerfs interest in the Property
under this Contract for the amount of the purchase price. The
Title Policy issued to Buyer will contain the following numbered
exceptions shown on the Ccwnmitment: ^ruercrQ Ltr J3' <JgTLr/6vV<?,

9.
Underlying Obligations.
Except for 1988 taxes and
assessments, Sellers warrant that there are no underlying
obligations against the Property.
10. Sellers' Covenant Against Liens. Except for the liens
and encumbrances listed in Sections 8 and 9, Sellers covenant to
keep the Property free and clear of all liens and encumbrances
resulting from acts of Sellers.
11. Buyer's Covenant Against Liens.
Buyer covenants to
keep the Property free and clear of all liens and encumbrances
resulting from acts of Buyer during the term of this Contract,
except for property which Buyer purchases under Section 4 herein.
12.

Survey.

Sellers agree, at their expense, to provide
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Buyer with a certified ALTA survey within forty-five (45) days
after Buyer obtains from Sandy City the commercial zoning for the
Property.
13. Zoning.
Sellers warrant and represent that they have
received no claim nor notice of any building or zoning violation
concerning the Property which has not been remedied prior to the
execution of this Contract.
14. Taxes and Assessments. Sellers agree to pay all taxes
and assessments of every kind which become due on the Property
during the life of this Contract.
Sellers covenant that there
are no taxes, assessments, or liens against the Property not
mentioned in Section 8.
Buyer agrees to pay all taxes and
assessments upon and after execution of the documents described
in paragraph 3 above. Buyer further agrees to reimburse Sellers
for all taxes and assessment they pay from the Contract date to
the execution of the documents described in paragraph 3 above.
15. No Waste. Buyer agrees not to commit nor suffer to be
committed any waste, spoil or destruction in or upon the Property
which would impair Sellers' security.
16. Commercial Zoning. Buyer, at its expense, shall apply
for commercial zoning on the Property to build a commercial
center thereon.
However, should Buyer fail, with or without
cause, to obtain such commercial zoning prior to March 3, 1989,
then the Contract shall be void and the Down Payment refunded to
Buyer.
17. Sellers1 Option to Discharge Obligations.
If Buyer
defaults in the payment of taxes, assessments or other expenses
of the Property, Sellers may, at Sellers' option, pay said taxes,
assessments, insurance premiums or other expenses.
If Sellers
elect to do so, Buyer agrees to repay Sellers upon demand all
such sums so advanced and paid by Sellers together with interest
thereon from date of payment of said sums at the rate of ten
percent (10%) per annum until paid.
When the principal sum
provided in this Contract is paid, if Buyer fails to also repay
Sellers such advances, Sellers may refuse to convey title to the
Property until such repayment is made.
18. Buyers Default. Should Buyer fail to comply with any
of the terms hereof, Sellers may, in addition to any other
remedies afforded the Sellers in this Contract or by law, elect
either of the following remedies:
A.
Sellers shall give Buyer written notice
specifically stating: (1) the Buyer's default(s); (2) that Buyer
shall have thirty (30) days from its receipt of such written
notice within which to cure the default(s), which cure shall
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include payment of Sellers' costs and reasonable attorney's fees;
and (3) Sellers1 intent to elect this remedy if the Buyer does
not cure the default(s) within thirty (30) days.
Should Buyer
fail to cure such default(s) within the thirty (30) days, then
Sellers shall give to Buyer another written notice informing
Buyer of his failure to cure the default(s) and of Sellers'
election of this remedy.
Immediately upon Buyer's receipt of
this second written notice, Sellers shall be released from all
obligations at law and equity to convey the Property to Buyer,
and Buyer shall become at once a tenant-at-will of Sellers. All
payments which have been made by Buyer prior thereto under this
Contract shall, subject to then existing law and equity, be
retained by Sellers as liquidated and agreed damages for breach
of this Contract; or
B.
Sellers shall give Buyer written notice
specifically stating: (1) The Buyer's default(s); (2) that Buyer
shall have thirty (30) days from its receipt of such written
notice within which to cure the default(s); and (3) Sellers'
intent to elect this remedy if the Buyer does not cure the
default(s) with the thirty (30) days. Should Buyer fail to cure
such default(s) within the thirty (30) days, then Sellers shall
give to Buyer another written notice informing Buyer of its
failure to cure the default(s), Sellers1 election of this remedy,
and that the entire unpaid balance hereunder is at once due and
payable. Thereupon, Sellers may treat this Contract as a note
and mortgage, pass or tender title to Buyer subject thereto, and
proceed immediately with a mortgage foreclosure in accordance
with the laws of the State of Utah. Upon filing the foreclosure
complaint in court, Sellers shall be entitled to the immediate
appointment of a receiver. The receiver may take possession of
the Property, collect rents, issues and profits therefrom and
apply them to the payment of the obligation hereunder, or hold
them pursuant to the order of the court.
Upon entry of a
judgment of foreclosure, Sellers shall not be entitled to
possession of the Property until the redemption period expires.
19. Buyer's Remedies.
In addition to any other remedy
available to Buyer at law or in equity, Buyer may elect to
rescind this Contract upon the occurrence of any of the
following:
A*

Buyer's reasonable objection to the survey;

B.
Buyer's inability to obtain direct and immediate
access, without unreasonable expense, to existing utilities for
sewer, water, natural gas and electricity;
C.
Buyer's failure to obtain access to the Property
from paved public roadways;
D.

Buyer's failure, with or without cause, to obtain
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commercial zoning, acceptable to Buyer, for a commercial center
on the Property; and
E.
Sellers breach of any covenant or term contained
in this Contract•
Upon rescission of the Contract, the Down Payment shall be
returned to Buyer and Buyer shall have no further obligations
under this Contract.
20. Time of Essence. It is expressly agreed that time is
of the essence in this Contract.
21. Captions. Section captions shall not in any way limit
modify, or alter the provisions in the Section.
22. Notices.
Except as otherwise provided herein, all
notices required under this Contract will be effective when: (a)
personally delivered; or (b) mailed certified or registered,
addressed to the applicable party at the address shown in this
contract, or at such other address as may be hereinafter
designated by such party by written notice to the other party.
23. Binding Effect. This Contract is binding on the heirs,
personal representatives, successors and assigns of the
respective parties hereto,
24. Entire Agreement.
This Contract contains the entire
agreement between the parties hereto. Any provision hereof not
enforceable under the laws of the State of Utah shall not affect
the validity of any other provisions hereof.
No supplement,
modification or amendment of this Contract shall be binding on
the parties hereto unless signed in writing by both parties
hereto.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have duly executed this
Contract the day and year first above written.
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BUYER:/]

Sellers:

COMMER^IAI*-^NVESTMENT CORPORATION

\

/'I

r

fl

/

j

Don SiggarcJyOfrustee*
Glenna F.

Siggarc^/^rustee*

ACKNOWLEDGMENT
STATE OF UTAH

)
) SS.

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
On

the

*>l*

day of

, 19 8&_

^JJAJJATT

personally appeared before me Don goggard and Glenna F. Siggard,
Trustees, signers of the above instrument, who duly acknowledged
to me that they executed the same.

1

/tJ&//s

Not^±y/#ublic
Res ding at
s / ^

(//%£

My commission expires:

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)
:ss.
)

On the . 3 / ^ day of
ft/j^^fi
, 1 9 ^ £ , personally
appeared before me ^Z^ufi///
/y2 //Js/jkrzJ
who being by me
duly sworn, did say that he #s the
///£/ /sKZyunksff
of
Commercial Investment Corporation, a Utah corporation and that
instrument was signed in behalf of said corporation by authority
of its bylaws (or of a resolution of its Board of Directors as
the case may be), and said /^^^IOIJd
^/{ft/mri—
acknowledge to me
that said corporation executes; the^same.

Residing at

4fUC,

(dtii/*

My conunission expires:

•Trustee under the Don Siggard and Glenna F. Siggard Family
Trust Agreement
23:Busch.Cnt
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Exhibit "B"

WHEN RECORDED, MAIL TO:
Busch Corporation
5250 South 300 West, Suite 100
Murray, Utah 84107
WARRANTY DEED
Don Siggard and Glenna F. Siggard, Trustees, grantors, Salt Lake
City, County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, hereby CONVEY and
WARRANT to Commercial Investment Corporation, a Utah corporation
of Murray, Utah, grantee, for the sum of Ten DOLLARS and other
good and valuable consideration the following described tract of
land in Salt Lake County, State of Utah:
See legal description attached hereto
and incorporated herein as Exhibit "A."
DATED this

day of

, 19

.

Don Siggard, Trustee*
Glenna F. Siggard, Trustee*
STATE OF UTAH

)
) ss.
County of Salt Lake )
On the
day of
, 19 , personally appeared
before me Don Siggard, Trustee and Glenna F. Siggard, Trustee who
being by me duly sworn, did duly acknowledge to me that they
executed the same.

Notary Public
Residing at _
My commission expires:

* Trustee under the Don Siggard and Glenna F. Siggard Family
Trust Agreement

Exhibit "C"
When Recorded Mail To:
Don and Glenna F. Siggard Trustees
3318 Oakcliff Drive
Holladay, Utah 84124
TRUST DEED
THIS TRUST DEED, made effective this 3rd day of March, 1988,
between Commercial Investment Corporation, a Utah corporation, as
TRUSTOR, whose address is 5250 South 300 West, Suite 100, Murray,
Utah 84107, Landmark Title Company,TRUSTEE, and Don Siggard and
Glenna F. Siggard, Trustees, BENEFICIARY.
WITNESSETH: That Trustor CONVEYS AND WARRANTS TO TRUSTEE IN
TRUST, WITH POWER OF SALE, the following described property,
situated in Salt Lake County, State of Utah:
See legal description attached hereto
and incorporated herein as Exhibit "A."
Together with all buildings, fixtures and improvements thereon
and all water rights, rights of way, easements, rents, issues,
profits, income, tenements, hereditament, privileges and
appurtenances thereunto belonging now or hereafter used or
enjoyed with said property, or any part thereof, SUBJECT,
HOWEVER, to the right, power and authority hereinafter given to
and conferred upon Beneficiary to collect and apply such rents,
issues, and profits;
FOR THE PURPOSE OF SECURING.
(1) payment of the
indebtedness evidenced by a trust deed note of even date herewith
and all sums due thereunder, in the face amount of $
,
made by Trustor, payable to the order of Beneficiary at the times
and in the manner therein set forth, and any extensions and/or
renewals or modifications thereof; (2) the performance of each
agreement of Trustor herein contained; (3) the payment of such
additional loans or advances as hereafter may be made to Trustor,
or its successors or assigns, when evidenced by a promissory note
or notes reciting that they are secured by this Trust Deed; and
(4) the payment of all sums expended or advanced by Beneficiary
under or pursuant to the terms hereof, together with interest
thereon as herein provided.
TO PROTECT THE SECURITY OF THIS TRUST DEED:
1. Trustor agrees to comply with all laws, covenants and
restrictions affecting said property; not to commit or permit
waste thereof; not commit, suffer or permit any act upon said
property in violation of law; to do all other acts which from the
character or use of said property may be reasonably necessary,
the specific enumerations herein not excluding the general.

2. Trustor agrees to appear in and defend any action or
proceeding purporting to affect the security hereof, the title to
said property, or the rights or powers of Beneficiary or Trustee;
provided, however, that such action or proceeding shall arise
from a person or entity claiming by, through, or under Trustor.
3. Trustor agrees to pay before delinquent all taxes and
assessments affecting said property, including all assessments ^
upon water company stock and all rents, assessments, charges, andj\£5
liens vith interest, on said property or any part thereof, which^ '
at any time appear to be prior or superior thereto.Trustor further agree.
not to encumber the property, subject to this T. D. with any addit'l mort4. Trustor agrees should Trustor fail to make any payment >gage.
or to do any act as herein provided, then Beneficiary or Trustee,^vj^x
but without obligation so to do and without notice to or demand^ '" /
upon Trustor and without releasing Trustor from any obligation /^ . I
hereof, may: Make or do the same in such manner and to such/(f\l/*
extent as either may deem necessary to protect the securityw/'^
hereof; Beneficiary or Trustee being authorized to enter upon v
said property for such purposes; commence, appear in and defend
any action or proceeding purporting to affect the security hereof
or the rights or powers of Beneficiary or Trustee; pay, purchase,
contest, or compromise any encumbrance, charge or lien which in
the judgment of either appears to be prior or superior hereto.
This paragraph 4, however, does not apply if the claim of a third
party would constitute a breach of the covenants in the Warranty
deed from Beneficiary to Trustor.
5. Trustor agrees to pay immediately and without demand all
sums expended hereunder by Beneficiary or Trustee, with simple
interest from date of expenditure at the rate of ten percent
(10%) per annum until paid, and the repayment thereof shall be
secured hereby.
6. Should said property or any part thereof be taken or
damaged by reason of any public improvement or condemnation
proceeding, or damaged by fire, or earthquake, or in any other
manner, Beneficiary shall be entitled to all compensation,
awards, and other payments or relief therefor, and shall be
entitled as their option to commence, appear in and prosecute in
their own name, any action or proceedings, or to make any compromise or settlement, in connection with such taking or damage.
All such compensation, awards, damages, rights of action and
proceeds, including the proceeds of any policies of fire and
other insurance affecting said property, are hereby assigned by
Beneficiary, who shall apply the same on the indebtedness secured
hereby or to restore or repair the property damaged or otherwise
as directed by Trustor.
7. At any time and from time to time upon written request
of Beneficiary, and after payment of the Trustee's fees and
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presentation of this Trust Deed and the Note, without affecting
the liability of any person for the payment of the indebtedness
secured hereby, Trustee may (a) consent to the making of any map
or plat of said property; (b) join in granting any easement or
creating any restriction thereon; (c) join in any subordination
or other agreement affecting this Trust Deed or the lien or
charge thereof; (d) reconvey, without warranty, all or any part
of said property. The grantee in any reconveyance may be
described as Mthe person or persons entitled thereto," and the
recitals therein of any matters or facts shall be conclusive
proof of the truthfulness thereof. Trustor agrees to pay
reasonable Trustee's fees for any of the services mentioned in
this paragraph.
8. As additional security, Trustor hereby assigns to
Beneficiary, during the continuance of these trusts, all rents,
issues, royalties, and profits of the property affected by this
Trust Deed. Unless Trustor executes a separate assignment to
Beneficiary requiring that rents and profits be paid to
Beneficiary, or until Trustor shall default in the payment of any
indebtedness secured hereby or in the performance of any
agreement hereunder, Trustor shall have the right to collect all
such rents, issues, royalties, and profits earned prior to the
default as they become due and payable. If Trustor shall default
as aforesaid, Trustor's right to collect any of such moneys shall
cease and Beneficiary shall have the right, with or without
taking possession of the property affected hereto, to collect all
rents, royalties, issues, and profits. Failure or discontinuance
of Beneficiary at any time or from time to time to collect any
such monies shall not in any manner affect the subsequent
enforcement by Beneficiary of the right, power, and authority to
collect the same. Nothing contained herein, nor the exercise of
the right by Beneficiary to collect, shall be, or be construed,
to be, an affirmation by Beneficiary of any tenancy, lease or
option, nor an assumption of liability under, nor a subordination
of the lien or charge of this Trust Deed to any such tenancy,
lease or option.
9. After Beneficiary has given Trustor written notice of
any default by Trustor hereunder and Trustor fails to'cure such
default within thirty (30) days after receipt of such notice,
Beneficiary may, either in person, by agent, or by a receiver to
be appointed by the court (Trustor hereby consenting to the
appointment of a person designated by Beneficiary as such
receiver), enter upon and take possession of said property or any
part thereof, in their own name sue for or otherwise collect said
rents, issues, and profits, including those past due and unpaid,
and apply the same upon any indebtedness secured hereby and in
such order as Beneficiary may determine.
10.
The entering upon and taking possession of said
property, the collection of such rents, issues, and profits or
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the proceeds of fire and other insurance policies, or
compensation or awards for any taking or damage of said property,
and the application or release thereof as aforesaid, shall not
cure or waive any default or notice of default hereunder or
invalidate any act done pursuant to such notice.
11. The failure on the part of Beneficiary to promptly
enforce any right hereunder shall not operate as a waiver of such
right and the waiver by Beneficiary of any default shall not
constitute a waiver of any other or subsequent default.
12.
Upon default by Trustor in the payment of any
indebtedness secured hereby or in the performance of any
agreement hereunder, Beneficiary shall give Trustor written
notice specifically stating: (1) Trustors' default(s) (2) That
Trustor shall have 30 days from its receipt of such written
notice within which to cure the default(s); and (3) Beneficiary's
intent to elect either to foreclosure judicially or nonjudicially if Trustor does not cure the default(s) within the
thirty (30) days. Should Trustor fail to cure such default(s)
within the thirty (30) days, then Beneficiary shall give to
Trustor another written notice informing Trustor of its failure
to cure the default(s) and, Beneficiary's election of their
remedy to foreclose either judicially or non-judicially, and that
the entire unpaid balance under the Note is at once due and
payable.
In the event of such default, Beneficiary may elect to
foreclose this Trust Deed under Title 57, Chapter 1 of Utah Code
Ann. (1953, as amended). Beneficiary may also elect to foreclose
this Trust Deed in the manner provided by law for the foreclosure
of mortgages on real property.
13. Beneficiary may appoint a successor trustee at any time
by filing for record in the office of the County Recorder of each
county in which said property or some part thereof is situated, a
substitution of trustee. From the time the substitution is filed
for record, the new trustee shall succeed to all the powers,
duties, authority and title of the trustee named herein or of any
successor trustee. Each such substitution shall be executed and
acknowledged, and notice thereof shall be given and proof thereof
made, in the manner provided by law.
14. This Trust Deed shall apply to, inure to the benefit
of, and bind all parties hereto, their heirs, legatees, devisees,
personal representatives, successors, and assigns.
All
obligations of Trustor hereunder are joint and several. The term
"Beneficiary" shall mean the owner and holder, including any
pledgee, of the note secured hereby. In this Trust deed, whenever the context so requires, the masculine gender includes the
feminine and/or neuter, and the singular number includes the
plural.
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15. Trustee accepts this Trust when this Trust Deed, duly
executed and acknowledged, is made a public record as provided by
law. Trustee is not obligated to notify any party hereto of
pending sale under any other Trust deed or of any action or
proceeding in which Trustor, Beneficiary, or Trustee shall be a
party, unless brought by Trustee.
16. This Trust Deed shall be construed according to the
laws of the State of Utah.
17. Trustor hereby requests that a copy of any notice of
default and of any notice of sale hereunder be mailed to it at
the address hereinbefore set forth.
TRUSTOR:
COMMERCIAL INVESTMENT CORPORATION
By
Its:
STATE OF UTAH

)
: ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
On the
day of
, 19 , personally appeared
before me, who being by me duly sworn, did say that he is the
of Commercial Investment Corporation, a Utah
corporation, and that said instrument was signed in behalf of
said corporation in authority of its bylaws (or of a resolution
of its board of directors, as the case may be), and said
, acknowledged to me that said corporation
executed the same.
Notary Public
Residing at _
My commission expires:

5

EXHIBIT "D"
TRUST DEED NOTE
$

Salt Lake City, Utah
Effective March 3, 1988
FOR VALUE RECEIVED, the undersigned promises to pay to the

order of Don Siggard and Glenna F. Siggard, Trustees, at 3318
Oakcliff Drive, Salt Lake City, Utah 84124, or at such other
place as the holder hereof may designate,
Dollars ($

), together with

interest from date at the rate of ten percent (10%) per annum on
the unpaid principal, said principal and interest payable as
follows:
Annual interest payments beginning March 3, 1989
and continuing on the 3rd day of each succeeding March
thereafter until March 3, 1998 at which time the entire
unpaid principal shall be fully paid.
Each payment shall be applied first to accrued interest and
the balance to the reduction of principal.

Holders agree to

cause the Trustee under the Trust Deed to partially reconvey
their Trust Deed on the Property upon principal payment under
this Note of $35,000.00 per acre.

Maker may make such request

and designate which acreage is to be reconveyed at any such time
as Maker makes any principal payments hereunder.
This Note is secured by a Trust Deed of even date herewith.
COMMERCIAL INVESTMENT CORPORATION,
a Utah corporation
By
Its
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AMENDMENT

Tnis Amendment is entered into this 30th day of March, 1989, by
and between Don Siggard and Glenna F. Siggard, Trustees ( "Sellers"), now located at 1480 East Mt. Manor Circle, Salt Lake
.City,
Utah 84121, and Commercial Investment Corporation ("Buy[etm) whose address is 5295 South 300 West, Suite 510, Murray,
[otah 84107.
[This Amendment shall modify that Real Estate Contract (herein'after referred to as •Contract") entered into between the parties
[on August 31, 1988.*
•jn consideration of the mutual promises contained herein and
Mother good and valuable consideration the receipt and sufficiency
[of which are hereby acknowledged:
1.

Seller agrees to sell and Buyer agrees to buy 16 acres
within the tract of real property more fully described in
the Contract. All other terms in Paragraph 1 of the Contract
shall remain the same.

2.

Sellers acknowledge receipt of the $56,000 interest payment
that was due and payable on March 3# 1989•.

3.

Paragraph 16 of the Contract is deleted* Buyers shall have
no obligations to Sellers with regard to obtaining zoning
for the real estate described in the Contract.

4.

Parties agree that the Contract is in full force and effect.

5.

All of the provisions in the Contract not
shall continue in full force and effect.
SELLERS:

BUYER:
COMMEFC

modified herein

INVESTMENT CORPORATION

Glenna F. Siggard, Trustee*
•Trustee under the Don Siggard and Glenna F. Siggard Family Trust
Agreement

EXHIBIT B

[-* EXHIBIT
5
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STATE OF UTAH

)

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)

:SS.

On the jy*_
day o f ^ g ^ f / ^
, 1989, personally appeared
before m£^&$g*£^qqard and Glenna F, Siggard, Trustees, signers of
the Jp&^y
itt&Zs&ent,
who duly acknowledged to me that they
exec

^ £u/>

Public
ing a t _ ^ ^

COUNTY Or^S&TTLAKE

(/AXs

)

1989, personally appeared
On t h e 3 ^ day o f y ^ ^
{7s?*t«doJ /I ^USi<~f.
who being by me duly sworn,
before me
of Commercial
did say that he is /the
^£v
fft*u/m7'
Investment Corporation, a Utah corporation and that instrument
was signed in behalf of said corporation by authority of its
bylaws (or of a resolution of its Board of Directors as the case
may be) and said
/ZtottAJ£2&JASAT^
acknowledged to me
:ion executes the same.
that said corporate

My coi

«rJL/t
zf^

N>ra*ry P u b l i c
5siding at

tfAAs
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P A Y E E

D f T A C H T H I S STATEMENT BEFORE DEPOSITING

i u s c H pRdf»cirfit*. I N C .
• A L T L A K l CITY,

DATE

3-30-89

INVOICE NO

DESCRIPTION

F i r s t annual I n t e r e s t Payment on 16 Acres
3 35,000 per acre

AMOUNT

56,000.00

UTAH
DISCOUNT

on

OIOUCTION

NET AMOUNT

56,000.00

TabF

March 5, 1990

Commercial Investment Corp.
5295 So. 300 West
Murray, Ut. 84107

To whom it may concern,
To comply with section
Don Siggard and Glenna
Corporation dated August
buyers default in annual
^Dollars ($56,000.00) as
days from receipt of this

Eighteen-A with the contract between
F. Siggard to commercial investment
31, 1989, we submit this notice of
option payment of Fifty Six Thousand
of March 3, 1990.
Buyer has thirty
notice to cure the default.

Don Siggard
3165 Fur Hollow Dr.
Sandy, Utah 84093

Please note address change
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Commercial Investment Corp,
5295 So- 3rd West
Murray, Utah 84107

April 3, 1990

Commercial Investment Corp.,
In compliance to section 18-A of the contract with Don & C e n n a
Siggard and the Commercial Investment Corp. dated Augur
31,
1988, we submit this second letter of buyers default in
compliance to the agreement in the contract. Since, the default
notified in the first letter mailed March 5, 1990 was not cured,
rt "• ipt of this letter releases seller of all obligations to
the original contract with Commercial Investment Corp. dated
August 31, 1988.

CC: DS/ks

-£*7

•ftr~r
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CORBRLDGE. B A I R D Si C H R I S T E N S E N
ATTORNEYS AT

LAW

2 1 5 S O U T H STATE
SUITE 800

SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 8 4 1 1 1
LAWRENCE E. CORBRIDGE
JOHN K N A F P BAXRD
JAMES L CHRISTENSEN
RICHARD C T E R R Y
PAUL D. NEWTON
MARK J MORRISK
MICHAEL LEE
TAMAR a JERGENSEN

TELEPHONE
<801» 534-09O9
TELECOPIER
<801> 5 3 4 - 1 9 4 8

A p r i l 4,

1990

Via Mail, Certified Mail, Hand-Delivery
Mr. Don Siggard and Glenna F. Siggard, Trustees
3165 Fur Hollow Drive
Sandy, UT 84093
Dear Mr. and Mrs. Siggard:
I have been retained by Commercial Investment Corporation to
respond to your letters dated March 5, 1990, and April 3, 1990.
In reviewing your notices and Commercial Investment Corporation's
file I note the following deficiencies:
1.
The Amendment executed by Commercial Investment
Corporation on March 30, 1989, has not been executed by Glenna F.
Siggard, trustee;
2.
Don Siggard and Glenna F. Siggard, trustees under the
Don and Glenna F. Siggard Family Trust Agreement have not sent
any notices required under paragraph 18 of the Real Estate
Contract;
3.

The April 3, 1990, notice was sent two days premature.

For the above stated reasons, both the March 5, 1990 letter
and the April 3, 1990 letter are deficient. You are hereby put
on notice that Commercial Investment Corporation will not
recognize any notices in connection with the Real Estate Contract
executed on August 31, 1988, unless they are executed by both Don
Siggard and Glenna F. Siggard, trustees. Moreover, Commercial
Investment Corporation hereby requests the return of the
Amendment dated March 30, 1989, with the original signatures of
both Don Siggard, trustee, and Glenna F. Siggard, trustee.
As you know, Commercial Investment Corporation has obtained
commercial zoning and site plan approval from Sandy City.
Pursuant to paragraph 12 of the Real Estate Contract, you were
required to obtain and provide Commercial Investment Corporation
with a certified ALTA survey which you have failed to do. You
are hereby put on notice of your breach under paragraph 12 of the
Real Estate Contract and requested to deliver the ALTA survey
immediately,

T- EXHIBIT
3

Don and Glenna Siggard
April 5, 1990
Page 2

This letter shall serve as the written notice required under
paragraph 3 of the Real Estate Contract that Commercial
Investment Corporation will be ready to select a mutually
convenient date for the execution and delivery of the Warranty
Deed, Trust Deed and Note after receiving the survey.
Commercial Investment Corporation also requests evidence of
full payment of all taxes and assessments against the property as
required under paragraph 14 of the Real Estate Contract prior to
the exchange of the Warranty Deed, Trust Deed and Note.
Thank you for your attention in this matter.
I expect
prompt response with regard to delivery of the executed Amendment
ALTA survey, and proof of payment of taxes.
Sincerely,
CORBRIDGE BAIRD & CHRISTENSEN

JLC/amj
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WHEN RECORDED PLEASE MAIL TOt
mercial Investment Corp.
/0 Busch Corporation
obert 8usch
295 South 320 West if510
LC, Utah 84107

NOTICE OF INTEREST

^M^A
<#

\^

KNOW ALL MEN 8Y THESE PRESENTS:
The undersigned hereby give notice of an interest claimed with
respect to certain real property located in Salt Lake County,
State of Utah, particularly described as follows, to-wit:
The Northwest Quarter of the Southeast Quarter of Section 20, Township 3,
South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian.
EXCEPTING TliERETROM the following* BEGINNING North 0° 07'30" West
1327.82 feet from the South quarter corner of Section 20; and r-ming
thence North 0°07'30" West 100.84 feet; thence North 09°52'30" East
456 feet; thene South 0° 07'3O" East 183.58 feet more or les3; thence
North 89°46,5i" West 456 feet moro or less to the point of 3ECINNING.
m.
Rrcjtuat of LANDMARK TITLE COMPANY
KATIE L DIXON, rtocoraor
Silt Lako County, Utah

*-2£

Entry NO. Jif&1053

COURTESY RECORDING
Thla document la being racordad aoitfy as i
courtesy and an accomodation to trie partita
named therein. LAN0MARK TITLE COMPANY
hereby expressly diactaima any rasponaibillty
or liability for the accuracy or the content
thereof.

DATEDi April 4, 1990

COMME^C^>jg^r^gi^T>g08PQRATIOW

^-

STATB OF UTAH

Robert R. Buach.

President

)
) SS.

COUNTY OP SALT LAKE

)

4th
dey of
On the
appeared before me
R^h^ri-

ft

ffmrh,

pr»«iri«nt

AP?U
rtf r^mm^rM »1

the sxgner(s) of the foregoing instrument,
to me that
ho
e x e c u t e d the same.

fotary
NO'

Public

Residing att SLC, Utah
My Commission Expiresi 07/90

19 90
Tnv«« t»m«nt» rftrpnrwMftn

who duly acknowledged

«<HEN RECORDED

PLEASE

HAIL

mi

tr\n\«rcial lnvfi»m«nt Corp.
C/O Hutch Corporation
ftobart Butch
W 9 5 South J2U Waat
1510
t.C, Utah
84107

KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE

NOTICE Of INTEREST

HRESENTSi

n
Irt

Tha undaralgnad haraby gtv* notlca of 9t\ Intaraat clalmad with
ratpact to cartain raal proparty locatad in Salt Laka County,
Stata of Utah, particularly daicribad aa follova, to-wtti

fH
2
^

Tha N o r t h v a a t Q u a r t a r o f t h a S o u t h a a t t Q u a r t a r o f S a c t i o n 2 0 , T o w n t h i p 3 ,
S o u t h , Ranga 1 E a a t , S a l t Laka Baaa and M a r i d l a n .
EXCEPTINC THEREFROH t h a f o l l o w i n g !
BEGINNING N o r t h 0 ° 0 7 ' 3 0 ' Waat
1 3 2 7 . 8 2 f a a t from t h a S o u t h q u a r t a r c o r n a r o f S a c t i o n 2 0 ; a n d r u n n i n g
thanca North 0 ° 0 7 ' 3 0
Haat 1 8 0 . 8 4 f r t i t h a n c a N o r t h 8 9 ° 5 2 ' 3 0 - E a a t
456 f a a t i t h a n a S o u t h 0 ° 0 7 ' 3 0 * E a a t
1 3 . 5 8 f a a t awra o r l a t a / t h a n c a
N o r t h 8 9 ° 4 6 ' 5 1 * Waat 4 5 6 f a a t mora o r l a t a t o t h a p o i n t o f BEGINNING.

COMT.T'YnSCO^OfNQ
Th!adc:imv|{
.. f
adoolalyaaa
oouriav* . .* i
-> ,ix ^v-tiaa
nti^rt Ih* .f» lAi'QV,;, % in^'.CC "WW
haruby a. ytrtj o-a- Jr. i v,y roj;,>Mifcll»ty
or ffaftiUty for uw accuracy or tha conto.it
fearacf.

DATED< A p r i l

^Kobart

STATE or in AH
COUNTY Of SALT LAKI

T ^ O y p RATION

COMMT

4. 1»»0

W. Butch.

Praaldant

)
) •••
)

l« fO . paraonally
O* *»• ^ 8 th
day of
April
appaarad
bafora
m*
__
. f 0 t ) i r # ^ *V a#, 1' Ll*+%iA*«* ,«' e * T M a l Tfivg«»yr,» Cnrn^rmtinn
inatr\mant,
who duly ackhowladgad
y »r?a"'Il«ar( a) of tha foragoing
/ ^ i f l W t
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•Ktcutad tha tama.
.
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MICHAEL I. ALDRICH & ASSOCIATES
Consulting Engineers
2144 South Highland Dr.
Suite 170
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106
(801)487-6563
DCG - 0 1003
DEC - 9 1993

December 7, 199 3

Mr. Randy Coke
Nigarrd, Coke and Vincent
3 33 North 3 00 West
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103
Dear Randy,
I am writing this letter to you to inform you that Mr. Don
Siggard contacted me 3 or 4 years ago to survey a parcel of
property, he owned near the Indian Hill Subdivision, in Sandy.
Don called and asked me to schedule some time during the
following week to survey this parcel for him. He said he would
get back to me with all the data I would need for the survey, and
with the date the survey should be completed. The survey was
never completed, because when Don never did get back to me with
any information or a date.
If I can be of further information, please call me.

ENGINEERS, LANDSCAPE ARCHITECTS, SURVEYORS, PLANNERS

TabK
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Randall N. Skanchy (USB #2968)
Scott D. Cheney (USB #6198)
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH
Attorneys for Defendants
1500 First Interstate Plaza
170 South Main Street
Post Office Box 45444
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0444
Telephone: (801) 521-3200
James L. Christensen, (USB #0639)
CORBRIDGE, BAIRD & CHRISTENSEN
Attorneys for Plaintiff
39 Exchange Place, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 534-0909
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

COMMERCIAL INVESTMENT
CORPORATION,
Plaintiff,

PRETRIAL ORDER

vs.
DON SIGGARD AND GLENNA F.
SIGGARD, as Trustees for the Don Siggard
and Glenna F. Siggard Family Trust,

Case No. 920904431CV
Judge Glenn K. Iwasaki

Defendants.

121647 3
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This matter came before the Court on July 17, 1995, at a Pre-Trial Conference
held pursuant to Rule 16 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure before the Honorable
Glenn K. Iwasaki, Third District Court Judge. Randall N. Skanchy and Scott D. Cheney of
Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough appeared as counsel for the Defendants, Don and
Glenna F. Siggard Family Trust, Don and Glenna F. Siggard Trustees (the "Siggards").
James L. Christensen of Corbridge, Baird and Christensen, appeared as counsel for Plaintiff,
Commercial Investment Corporation ("CIC"). The following action was taken:
1.

JURISDICTION. This is an action for specific performance of a real estate

contract for the sale of real property located in Salt Lake County, Utah, with the Siggards
asserting counterclaims for breach of contract, unjust enrichment, wrongful lien, breach of
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and for intentional interference with
prospective economic relations. Jurisdiction of the Court is thus invoked under Utah Code
Ann. Section 78-3-4 and is not disputed. The Court determined its jurisdiction to be present.
2.

VENUE. Venue is laid by CIC in this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann.

Section 78-13-1. The Court determined such venue to be proper.
3.

GENERAL NATURE OF THE PARTIES' CLAIMS.
(1)

Commercial Investment Corporation's Claims:
a. Breach of Contract. CIC has sued for breach of the Real E^iate
Contract, claiming the following breaches: Siggard declared the
contract in default, having already breached the contract first and

121647 3
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without complying with the notice requirements of the contract; Siggard
failed to timely provide an ALTA survey; Siggard refused to allow
plaintiff to designate its desired acreage; and Siggard refused to honor
the terms of the contract. CIC pleaded both rescission and specific
performance as potential remedies for the alleged breach.
b. Specific Performance. CIC pleaded as a separate cause of action
Specific Performance of the contract based on the alleged breaches of
contract by the defendants. CIC elected Specific Performance as its
chosen remedy by motion to the court dated January 25, 1995.
c. Relinquished Claims.
(i) Unjust Enrichment. CIC alleged in count two of the First Amended
Complaint that the Siggards were unjustly enriched by CIC's
development efforts on the property including engineering, planning and
the obtaining of commercial zoning for a portion of the property. CIC
also alleged the Siggards were unjustly enriched by retaining their
property without paying CIC adequate compensation. This claim was
relinquished by CIC in its election of specific performance as its remedy
in its motion and memorandum dated January 25, 1995.
(ii) Rescission. CIC claimed it was entitled under the contract to
rescind the contract and receive all payments made by CIC to Siggards
121647 3
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in the event of breach of the contract by the Siggards. This claim is
also relinquished by CIC's election of specific performance as its
remedy dated January 25, 1995.
Siggards' Defenses:
a. Breach of Contract
(i)

The Real Estate Contract is voidable for lack of consideration

and is unconscionable.
(ii)

CIC breached the contract by failing to make the down payment,

by failing to make annual interest payments under its terms, by failing to
designate property to be surveyed, thereby rendering performance by
Siggards impossible, and by placing a Notice of Interest on the
Siggards' property.
(iii)

CIC's claim for specific performance fails because of CIC's

failure to make a sufficient tender.
(iv)

CIC's claims are barred by the doctrine of unclean hands.

(v)

CIC failed to mitigate its alleged damages.

(vi)

CIC's claims are barred by waiver and estoppel in that CIC

waived its right to claim a lack of a survey for its failure to designate
the property to be surveyed.

4
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b. Unjust Enrichment
(i)

This claim is negated by virtue of CIC's election of specific

performance of the contract as its chosen remedy.
(ii)

Siggards have not been enriched due to any act of CIC.

c. Specific Performance
(i)

CIC has not tendered specific performance and is unable to

tender specific performance.
(ii)

CIC has unclean hands.

(iii)

CIC breached the contract by failing to make the down payment,
by failing to make annual interest payments under its terms, by
failing to designate the property to be surveyed, thereby
rendering performance by Siggards impossible, and by placing a
Notice of Interest on the Siggards' property.

d. Rescission
(i)

CIC's election of specific performance as its remedy negates this

claim.
(ii)

CIC breached the contract by failing to make the down payment,

by failing to make annual interest payments under its terms, by failing to
designate the property to be surveyed, thereby rendering performance by

121647 3
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Siggards impossible, and by placing a Notice of Interest on the
Siggards' property.
Siggards' Counterclaims:
a. Breach of Express Contract. CIC breached the express terms of the
Real Estate Contract by failing to make required annual interest
payments, failing to make the initial down payment, by failing to
designate the property to be surveyed and encumbering the real property
by filing a Notice of Interest on the subject property.
b. Uniust Enrichment. CIC would be unjustly enriched if it received
the property without making the down payment, without making the
required interest payments and by encumbering all of the Siggards'
property, despite having claim to only a portion of the subject property.
CIC would also be unjustly enriched if it is allowed to receive the
benefit of several years of unprecedented increase in the value of the
land without making some reasonable compensation for such increase in
the value of the land.
c. Breach of Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing. CIC's
failure to perform the contract, its refusal to designate the property to be
surveyed and its very entering into the Real Estate Contract without the
ability to perform the contract was in bad faith and constitutes a breach
6
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of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing implied in the Real Estate
Contract.
d. Wrongful Lien. CICs filing of a Notice of Interest encumbering the
entire thirty-eight (38) acres of the Siggards' property while having a
claim to only sixteen acres constitutes a wrongful lien on the Siggards'
property.
e. Interference with Prospective Economic Relations. CIC filed the
Notice of Interest with the improper purpose, causing interference in the
Siggards' prospective economic relations regarding the property.
4.

UNCONTROVERTED FACTS. The following facts are established by

admissions in the pleadings or by stipulation of counsel:
a.

CIC is a Utah corporation with its principal place of business in Salt

Lake County, Utah.
b.

The Defendants Don and Glenna F. Siggard are trustees of the Don and

Glenna F. Siggard Family Trust, a beneficial trust created under the laws of Utah.
c.

At all times relevant to this action, Robert Busch was president of CIC.

d.

On August 31, 1989, the parties entered into a real estate contract (the

"contract") for the sale and purchase of twenty (20) acres of a thirty-eight (38) acre parcel
located in Sandy, Utah, owned by the Siggard Family Trust.
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e.

The contract required and acknowledged the deposit of a down payment

by CIC to Landmark Title Company, although the actual payment of the down payment is
disputed.
f.

The contract also required, among other things, that CIC make annual

interest payments of ten percent (10%) per annum on the balance due to the'Siggards on
March 3 of each year until 1998, in the event the contract was not rescinded.
g.

The first annual interest payment was due March 3, 1989, unless the

contract was rescinded.
h.

The Siggards did not receive the first annual interest payment on or

before March 3, 1989.
i.

On March 5, 1989, the Siggards sent notice of default to CIC requiring

CIC to make the payment within 30 days, and CIC received the notice.
j.

CIC paid the first annual interest payment of $56,000.00 on March 30,

1989, within the required 30 days, after receiving notice of default.
k.

On March 30, 1989, the parties entered an Amendment to the Real

Estate Contract, changing, among other things, the acreage to be sold and purchased from
twenty (20) to sixteen (16) acres.
1.

On August 22, 1989, the Sandy City Commission entered Ordinance

89-33 rezoning 10 acres of the Siggards' property to Special District Neighborhood
Commercial (SD CN).
121647 3
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m.

The Siggards did not obtain nor deliver a survey to CIC within 45 days

of August 22, 1989, but did obtain and deliver a survey of the entire 38 acre parcel of
property to CIC in June 1994.
n.

CIC did not pay, nor did the Siggards receive the annual interest

payment that was due on March 3, 1990.
o.

On March 5, 1990, the Siggards mailed a notice of default of the

contract to CIC; CIC received this notice on March 6, 1990.
p.

CIC did not make the annual interest payment.

q.

On April 3, 1990, the Siggards again notified CIC of its alleged default

and its failure to cure, and declared themselves released of the obligations under the contract;
CIC received this notice on April 3, 1990.
r.

On April 4, 1990, CIC filed a Notice of Interest claiming an interest in

all thirty-eight (38) acres of the Siggards' property.
s.

On April 4, 1990, CIC sent a letter to the Siggards claiming default by

the Siggards and demanding delivery of an ATLA survey and requiring proof of payment of
taxes.
t.

CIC did not have, in 1990, nor has it ever had, a bank account in its

name.
5.

CONTESTED ISSUES OF FACT. Contested issues of fact remaining for

decision are:
121647 3
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a.

Except as designated as uncontested above, all factual matters relevant

to the questions of law or fact listed below.
b.

Who drafted the contract.

c.

Whether plaintiff made ths down payment, and whether such payment

was deposited with Landmark Title.
d.

Whether plaintiff was ready, willing and able to perform the contract in

1990, and today.
e.

Whether and when Siggards received notice of the rezoning of 10 acres.

f.

Whether the Siggards refused to allow CIC to designate the acres it

would buy and otherwise refused to comply with the terms of the contract prior to March 3,
1990.
g.

Whether Siggard complied with the forfeiture and notice provisions of

h.

Whether plaintiff has incurred any damages.

i.

Whether CIC ever tendered its full performance of the contract.

j.

Whether CIC had, in 1990, or at any other time, any assets other than

the contract.

the Real Estate Contract.
k.
6.

Whether CIC ever designated the property to be surveyed.

CONTESTED ISSUES OF LAW. The contested issues of law, in addition to

those implicit in the foregoing issues of fact, are:
121647.3
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a.

Whether the contract is enforceable.

b.

Whether Siggards breached the contract, and when.

c.

Whether encumbering all 38 acres of Siggards' property constitutes a

d.

Whether CIC breached the contract.

e.

Whether CIC is entitled to specific performance, and if so, whether CIC

wrongful lien.

owes any interest to date and whether the contract performance dates should be extended.
f.

Whether CIC breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.

g.

Whether CIC tendered its full performance under the contract and

whether CIC is excused from that tender.
h.

The measure of Siggards' damages, if any.

i.

Whether Siggard was required to comply with the forfeiture and notice

provisions of the contract.
j.

Whether plaintiff intentionally interfered with Siggards' prospective

economic relations.
k.

Whether CIC has the duty to mitigate when it is not seeking damages.

1.

Whether Siggards are entitled to attorneys' fees as a measure of their

damages as a result of CIC's alleged breach of the contract and of the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing or under any other statutory or legal basis.

121647 3
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7.

EXHIBITS. The following documents are expected trial exhibits of the

parties:
a.

The parties have agreed and stipulated to the admission of the exhibits

as listed in the attached Trial Exhibit list.
b.

Plaintiffs' proposed trial exhibits are listed in Appendix ;,A" attached

hereto and incorporated herein.
c.

Defendant's proposed trial exhibits are listed in Appendix "B" attached

hereto and incorporated herein.
d.

The parties will file a stipulation as to which exhibits may be admitted

into evidence within seven (7) days of trial.
e.

The parties shall exchange copies of their proposed trial exhibits within

seven (7) days of trial.
f.

If other exhibits are to be offered and their necessity can be reasonably

anticipated, they will be designated in a writing filed with the Court and submitted to
opposing counsel at least three (3) days prior to trial.
8.

WITNESSES. Except with respect to rebuttal witnesses, if any:
a.

In the absence of reasonable notice to opposing counsel to the contrary,

CIC will call the following persons as witnesses: Bob Busch, Andrew Walton, Bailey
Butters, the Siggards, Gary Free, Ken Dyer, Mike Coulam, George Shaw, and Gil Avillar.
CIC may call Greg Hales, Barbara Busch, and an engineer or surveyor.
121647 3
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CIC may use the depositions of Don Siggard, Bob Busch, Andy Walton, Mike
Coulam, George Shaw, and Gil Avillar.
b.

In the absence of reasonable notice to opposing counsel to the contrary,

defendants, the Siggards, will call the following persons as witnesses: Don and Glenna
Siggard, Jeff Jensen, David Van Drimmelen, Michael Aldrich and Richard Sorensen.
Defendants may call the following persons as witnesses: Mike Coulam, Mike Holmes and
Gil Avillar.
Defendants may use the depositions of Don Siggard, Andrew Walton, Robert
Busch, Mike Coulam, George Shaw, and Gil Avillar.
c.

In the event other witnesses are to be called at trial, a statement of their

names and addresses and the general subject matter of their testimony will be served upon
opposing counsel at least seven (7) days prior to trial. This restriction shall not apply to
rebuttal witnesses, the necessity of whose testimony reasonably cannot be anticipated before
the time of trial.
9.

MATTERS TO BE RESOLVED. Prior to commencement of trial briefing,

the following matters remain to be resolved by the court:

10.

a.

Appraisals — to be exchanged by July 21, 1995.

b.

Motions in Limine — to be argued on August 1, 1995, at 9:00 a.m.

REQUEST FOR INSTRUCTIONS, Requests for voir dire examination of

the jury and request for instructions to the jury shall be exchanged and submitted to the
121647 3
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Court by August 2, 1995. Counsel may supplement requested instructions during trial on
matters that were not reasonably anticipated prior to trial. Proposed written questions for
submission to the jury for the return of a special verdict, pursuant to Rule 49 of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure, shall be submitted to the Court at the same time as the request for
instructions to the jury.
11.

AMENDMENTS TO THE PLEADINGS. The Court allowed CIC to amend

the Complaint to add a claim for specific performance. CIC submitted its First Amended
Complaint on July 30, 1993.
12.

DISCOVERY. Discovery has been completed except for the interviewing or

deposition of witnesses which must be completed by July 27, 1905.
13.

TRIAL SETTING. The case was set for a three-day jury trial to commence

on August 1, 1995, at 9:00 o'clock a.m. at Room 301, 240 East 400 South, Salt Lake City,
Utah.
14.

POSSIBILITY OF SETTLEMENT. The possibility of settlement is

considered fair.

1216*7 3

14

00037

DATED this

V

<r
day of July, 1995.
BY THE CO

The Honorable Glenn K. Iwasaki
Third Judicial District Court Judge
Prior to execution by the Court, the foregoing Pretrial Order is hereby adopted this
day of July, 1995.
CORBRIDGE, BAIRD & CHRISTENSEN

c. C&-IT
es L. Christensen
irneys for Plaintiff
Commercial Investment Corporation
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK &
MCDONOUGH

Sieaiichy•>
Scott D. Cheney
Attorneys for Defendants
Don and Glenna F. Siggard
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on the * i | ^ day of July, 1995, I caused to be hand delivered, a
true and correct copy of the foregoing PRETRIAL ORDER to:

James L. Christensen
CORBRIDGE, BAIRD & CHRISTENSEN
Attorneys for Plaintiff
39 Exchange Place, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
„
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TRIAL EXHIBIT INDEX

Earnest Money Sales Agreement, March 3, 1988.
Promissory Note, March 3, 1988.
Site Plan (Exhibit A), April 19, 1988.
Letter to Allen McCandless from Bailey Butters, April 20, 1988 with
accompanying letter of April 20, 1988, property plat, legal description.
Commitment for Title Insurance, June 7, 1988.
Amended Commitment for Title Insurance, August 31, 1988.
Real Estate Contract, August 31, 1988.
Site Plan, November 8, 1988.
Letter to Allen McCandless from Bailey Butters, dated November 22, 1988.
Memo from Planning Department to Planning Commission and City Council, dated
November 23, 1988.
Sandy City Zone change documents (See Appendix A-1, 57 separate documents).
February 1989 Busch Comments with Regard to Stipulations from Crescent Village
Citizens Committee.
Sandy City Zoning Ordinance #89-2, #89-33, January 10, 1989.
Sandy City Zoning Ordinance #89-33.
§ 15-29-27, Sandy City Development Code.
Notice of Buyer's Default, March 6, 1989.
Amendment to Real Estate Contract, March 30, 1989.
$56,000 check stub of Busch Properties, Inc. dated March 30, 1989.
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Memo from Phil Glenn to Councilmen, Andy Walton and others, dated June 15,
1989.
Notice of Buyers Default, March 5, 1990 and certified mail return receipts.
Notice of Forfeiture of Buyers, April 3, 1990 and certified mail return receipts.
Notice of Interest, April 4, 1990.
Letter to Siggards from Christensen, April 4, 1990.
Handwritten note of Don Siggard, April 22, 1992.
Earnest Money Sales Agreement from Woodside Homes, Inc., September 14,
1992.
Earnest Money Sales Agreement from Perry & Associates, Inc., December 10,
1992.
December 7, 1993 Letter from Michael L. Aldrich to Randy Coke.
Sorensen ALTA Property Survey, June, 1994.
Drawings of legal descriptions for zoned property: April 20, 1988, November 8,
1988, Ordinance 89-33, Site Plan 1994.
CIC Appraisals.
Siggard Appraisal.
Site Plan Review Chapter 15-22 Site Plan Review.
Time Line of Events.
Property Tax Evaluations for 1988, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995.
Planning Commission Application dated September 20, 1994.
Sandy City Site Plan Review Procedures and Standards.
Site Plans, September 13, 1994.
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APPENDIX A

PLAINTIFFS ADDITIONAL EXHIBITS

CIC Timeline.
Aerial Photograph of Property.
Cash Receipts #310916 and 310917 dated September 20, 1994.
Subdivision or Site Plan Review Fees Form, September 14, 1994.
Application for Conditional Use Permit, September 20, 1994.
Update Market Analysis for Retail/Commercial Development - 11300 South 1000
East for Gardner and Associates by Leffler & Associates, September, 1994.
Letter to Sandy City Planning Commission from Bill Peperone, September 20,
1994.
Legal Description.
Letter to Sandy City Planning Department from Commercial Investment Corp.,
September 29, 1994.
Letter to Sandy City from Commercial Investment Corp., October 3, 1994.
Memorandum to Greg Hales from Bill Peperone, October 3, 1994.
Memorandum of Kathy Jeffery, Deputy City Attorney from Bill Peperone,
October 25, 1994.
Sandy City Meeting Minutes, October 25, 1994.
Commitment for Title Insurance, January 30, 1995.
Certificate of Deposit for $56,000 in the name of Commercial Investment
Corporation.
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APPENDIX B

DEFENDANTS' ADDITIONAL EXHIBITS
1.

September 8, 1992 letter from Randy Coke to Jim Christensen.

2.

September 14, 1994 letter to Jim Christensen from Jones, Waldo, Holbrook &
McDonough.

121647 3

TabL

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
—71ZZ

zxm

COMMERCIAL INVESTMENT CORP.
Plaintiff,

SPECIAL VERDICT

vs.
DON SIGGARD AND GLENNA F.
SIGGARD, as Trustees for the Don Siggard
and Glenna F. Siggard Family Trust,

Case No. 920904431CV
Judge Glenn K. Iwasaki

Defendants.

MEMBERS OF THE JURY:
Please answer the following questions based on your determination of whether the fact
in question has been established by a preponderance of the evidence. If you find that the
evidence supports a given fact by a preponderance you should answer the questions as to that
fact "Yes." If, on the other hand, if you find that the evidence as to a given fact is so equally
balanced that you cannot determine the preponderance of the evidence, or if you find that the
evidence preponderates against the fact presented, answer the question as to that fact "No."
Some questions have already been marked for you based upon the stipulation of the parties.
1.

Was the contract between Commercial Investment Corporation and the Siggards

a valid contract?
X Yes

No

133425 1
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2.

Did Commercial Investment Corporation fail to fully tender its performance

and perform all of its contractual obligations according to the terms of the Contract including
the timely payment of all amounts due?
X
3.

Yes

No

Was Commercial Investment Corporation excused from tendering its

performance and from performing its contractual obligations including its annual interest
payment obligations?

Yes
4.

X

No

,

-\

Is Commercial Investment Corporation/precluded^ from asserting that it is

excused from failing to perform its obligations by any one of the following: a) estoppel,b

)

waiver, and/or c) unclean hands?
5.

Is Commercial Investment Corporation entitled to specific performance of the

Real Estate Contract?
Yes
6.

\

No

Did the Siggards perform all steps necessary to forfeit Commercial Investment

Corporation's interest in the contract?
JL

7.

Yes

No

Was the Notice of Interest filed by Commercial Investment Corporation in

violation of Utah Wrongful Lien Statute?

_X Yes
8.

No

Did Commercial Investment Corporation breach the Real Estate Contract?
\

Yes

No

133425 1
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9.

Considering only the evidence concerning damages, and without being

concerned with the fault of any party in answering this question, what amount of money would
fairly and adequately compensate the Siggards for actual damages suffered by them proximately
caused by the filing of the Notice of Interest?
Amount: $

-f~h

The foregoing answers agreed upon, signed and returned to the Court this ^f^

day

of August, 1995.
(^^J^TC^J
i^Qj^person

^T^UIAJ

133425 1

flfli

TabM

Randall N. Skanchy (USB #2968)
Scott D. Cheney (USB #6198)
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH
1500 First Interstate Plaza
170 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorneys for Defendants and Counterclaim
Plaintiffs Don and Glenna F. Siggard

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

COMMERCIAL INVESTMENT CORP.
Plaintiff,

JUDGMENT

^r.

C T 6 "C^

vs.
DON SIGGARD AND GLENNA F.
SIGGARD, as Trustees for the Don Siggard
and Glenna F. Siggard Family Trust,

Case No. 920904431CV
Judge Glenn K. Iwasaki

Defendants.

Pursuant to Rule 58A(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, this Judgment is hereby
entered upon the verdict of the jury, the trial of this matter having come before the Court on
Tuesday, August 1, 1995, for jury trial, the jury being duly constituted and the trial proceeding
August 1, 2, 3 and 4, plaintiff and counterclaim defendant Commercial Investment Corporation
having been represented by James L. Christensen and Mark J. Morrise of the law firm
Corbridge, Baird & Christensen, and defendants and counterclaim plaintiffs Don Siggard and
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Glenna F. Siggard, as Trustees for the Don Siggard and Glenna F. Siggard Family Trust
("Siggards"), having been represented by Randall N. Skanchy and Scott D. Cheney of the law
firm of Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough. The jury, having carefully considered the
evidence, the testimony of the witnesses, argument by counsel and having received the exhibits,
jury instructions, and the special verdict, and the Court having received the jury's completed
special verdict which found as follows:
(i)

The contract between Commercial Investment Corporation and the

Siggards was a valid contract. (This finding was stipulated to by the parties prior to
submission to the jury); and
(ii)

Commercial Investment Corporation failed to fully tender its

performance and perform all of its contractual obligations according to the terms of
the Contract including the timely payments of all amounts due (this finding was
stipulated to by the parties prior to submission to the jury); and
(iii)

Commercial Investment Corporation was not excused from tendering

its performance and from performing its contractual obligations including its annual
interest payment obligations; and
(iv)

Commercial Investment Corporation is not allowed to assert that it was

excused from failing to perform its obligations by any one of the following:
a) estoppel, b) waiver and/or unclean hands.
(v)

Commercial Investment Corporation is not entitled to specific

performance of the Real Estate Contract; and

134285 3
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(vi)

The Siggards performed all steps necessary to forfeit Commercial

Investment Corporation's interest in the contract; and
(vii)

The Notice of Interest was filed by Commercial Investment Corporation

in violation of Utah Wrongful Lien Statute; and
(viii)

Commercial Investment Corporation breached the Real Estate Contract;

(ix)

Considering only the evidence concerning damages, and without being

and

concerned with the fault of any party in answering this question, what amount of
money would fairly and accurately compensate the Siggards for actual damages
suffered by them proximately caused by the filing of the Notice of Interest?
Amount: $

-0-

Based upon the findings of the jury and the stipulations of the parties, the Court enters
the following Judgment:
1.

Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint for Specific Performance is dismissed with

2.

Siggards' Counterclaims for breach of contract and breach of the covenant of

prejudice;

good faith and fair dealing are hereby granted, the Real Estate Contract is hereby made null and
void, and Commercial Investment Corporation's interest in any and all real property under the
Real Estate Contract is forfeited; and
3.

Siggards' Counterclaim for Wrongful Lien, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 38-9-1

is hereby granted and, because no actual damages were offered at trial or found by the jury, the
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statutory penalty of $1,000 is hereby entered of record, with a memorandum of costs and
attorneys' fees to be submitted.
DATED this / ( /

day of August, 1995.

Honorable Glenn K. Iwasa
District Judge
Approved as to Form:
CORBRIDGE, BAIRD & CHRISTENSEN

By.
James L. Christensen
Attorneys for Plaintiff and
Counterclaim Defendant
Commercial Investment Corporation
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH

By.
Randall N. Skanchy
Attorneys for Defendants and Counterclaim
Plaintiffs Don and Glenna F. Siggard, as
Trustees of the Don Siggard and Glenna F.
Siggard Family Trust
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Third judicial District

NOV
Randall N. Skanchy (USB #2968)
Scott D. Cheney (USB #6198)
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH
Attorneys for Defendants
1500 First Interstate Plaza
170 South Main Street
Post Office Box 45444
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0444
Telephone: (801) 521-3200

9 1995
Deputy Clerk

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

COMMERCIAL INVESTMENT CORP.
Plaintiff,
vs.

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL
:

DON SIGGARD AND GLENNA F.
:
SIGGARD, as Trustees for the Don Siggard :
and Glenna F. Siggard Family Trust,
:

Case No. 920904431CV
Judge Glenn K. Iwasaki

Defendants.

:

Plaintiff Commercial Investment Corporation's Motion for New Trial came on for
oral argument before the Honorable Glenn K. Iwasaki on Wednesday, November 1, 1995 at
9:00 a.m. Commercial Investment Corporation ("CIC") was represented at the hearing by

144768 1
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James C. Christensen; Randall N. Skanchy and Scott D. Cheney appeared on behalf of the
Siggards.
CIC's Motion for New Trial was based on two grounds: 1) That the jury's finding
that CIC's filing of the Notice of Interest violated the Utah Wrongful Lien Statute, Utah
Code Ann. Section 38-9-1 et seq. was against the law and unsupported by the evidence; and
2) that the jury's finding that the Siggards performed all steps necessary to forfeit CIC's
interest in the Real Estate Contract was against the law and unsupported by the evidence.
The Court, having now considered CIC's motion, the memoranda and authority
submitted by the parties, and, having heard oral argument and having been fully advised in
the premises, hereby ADJUDGES AND DECREES as follows:
1.

Plaintiffs arguments as to the jury's finding of CIC's violation of the

Wrongful Lien Statute and of the Siggards' performing all steps neccessary to forfeit CIC's
interest in the Real Estate Contract are not compelling.
2.

The evidence submitted to the jury at the trial of this case was sufficient to

support the jury's findings that CIC's filing of the Notice of Interest violated the Utah
Wrongful Lien Statute and that the Siggards performed all steps necessary to forfeit CIC's
interest in the Real Estate Contract.
3.

The law presented to and applied by the jury at trial as to those issues was

correct.
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Based on these findings it is hereby ORDERED that Plainitiff CIC's Motion for
New Trial is DENIED.

/2i_

DATED this _ /

day of November, 1995.

BY THE CO

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH

Randall N. Skanchy
Scott D. Cheney
Attorneys for Defendants
CORBRIDGE, BAIRD & CHRISTENSEN

ccZecz.
James\Christensen
AtteFfleys for Plaintiff

144768 1
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Or COuNSfL
M E N W Y 5, NYGAARO

September 8, 1992

James L. Christensen, Esq.
Corbridge, Baird & Christensen
Attorneys at Law
215 South State Street, Suite 800
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
RE:

Commercial Investment Corp. v. Siggard et al.

Dear James:
Enclosed please find a copy of the Answer and
Counterclaim which has, by this time, been filed in this matter.
At this time, I am putting your client on notice of a
few things. First, please consider this letter a written request
to remove the Notice of Interest filed on my clients' property.
If it is not removed within twenty days, the defendants and
counterclaimants will strongly seek three times the actual damages as provided in the applicable statute. Since your Complaint
seeks nothing but damages, I feel the Notice of Interest is
groundless and no more than a cloud to the title at this point.

As has
Deen tne case ail along, my clients would still need to know
which sixteen acres your client wants.

Page 2
September 8, 1992
James L. Christensen, Esq.

Please let me hear from you regarding your client's
position in this matter as soon as possible.
Sincerely,
NYGAARD, COftE Sr VINCENT

Rarfdy BT. Coke

RBC.aa
Ends.
cc. Mr. and Mrs. Don Siggard
Lewis Livingston, Esq.
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JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH
Attorneys for Defendants
1500 First Interstate Plaza
170 South Main Street
Post Office Box 45444
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0444
Telephone: (801) 521-3200

Deputy Clerk

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

COMMERCIAL INVESTMENT CORP.

ORDER AWARDING JUDGMENT
AGAINST CIC FOR:

Plaintiff,
(1) ATTORNEY FEES AND EXPERT
FEES; AND

vs.

DON SIGGARD AND GLENNA F.
SIGGARD, as Trustees for the Don Siggard
and Glenna F. Siggard Family Trust,
Defendants.

(2) COSTS AND DISBURSEMENTS
Case No. 920904431CV

S S O M O T Q,

Judge Glenn K. Iwasaki

^ ^ ^ " ^ - ^ ) * 3 CX^v

Defendants Don Siggard and Glenna F. Siggard as Trustees for the Don Siggard
and Glenna F. Siggard Family Trust ("Siggards") Motion for Award of Attorneys' Fees and
entry of Costs and Disbursements against plaintiff Commercial Investment Corporation's
("CIC") came on for oral argument before the Honorable Glenn K. Iwasaki at a hearing on
144771 1
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Wednesday, November 1, 1995 at 9:00 a.m. The Siggards were represented by Randall N.
Skanchy and Scott D. Cheney and James C. Christensen appeared on behalf of CIC.
The Court having considered the motions, supporting memoranda and the authority
submitted by the parties and affidavits of attorneys fees and memorandum of costs and
disbursements and having heard oral argument and otherwise having been fully advised of the
premises, hereby:
ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES as follows:
1.

That the Siggards are awarded as a judgment against CIC costs and

disbursements in the amount of $1,290.40 as the prevailing party in this litigation, the
Memorandum of Costs and Disbursements having been filed on August 22, 1995 and no
opposition to it presented by written objection or oral argument by counsel for CIC; and
2.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED AND ADJUDGED AND DECREED that

Defendant's Motion for Award of Attorneys' Fees and Expert's Fees is granted as a
judgment against CIC and awarded as follows:
Pre-trial and trial attorneys fees

-

$10,000.00

Post-trial attorneys fees

-

$ 4,000.00

Expert witness fees

-

$ 3.325.00

TOTAL

$17,325.00

The amounts awarded are based on the determination of the Court upon the
following findings of facts and conclusions of law:
144771 I
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FINDINGS OF FACT
(i)

The legal work set forth in the affidavits of counsel for Siggards was

performed; and
(ii)

The legal rates charged for the work performed are consistent with the rates

customarily charged in this locality for such legal services; and
(iii)

Additional facts considered were the experience, reputation and ability of

the lawyers, the substantial amount involved in the dispute and the result obtained; and
(iv)

That the sum of $10,000.00 for the work performed by counsel in pre-trial

motions, trial preparation and trial, and the sum of $4,000.00 for the post trial motions and
the sum of $3,325.00 for expert witness fees at trial were reasonable and necessary to
prosecute the Wrongful Lien claim in this action.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
(i)

The hours of legal services set forth in the affidavits were actually

performed.
(ii)

The legal rates charged for the work performed are consistent with the rates

customarily charged in this locality for such services.
(iii)

Additional factors of the experience, reputation and ability of the Siggard's

lawyers, the substantial amount involved in the dispute and the result obtained are factors the
court may and did consider in determining the reasonableness of attorneys' fees;
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(iv)

The sum of $14,000.00 in attorneys fees and $3,325.00 in expert witness

fees were reasonable and necessary in the prosecution of the Wrongful Lien claim in this
action
3.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that this

Judgment for attorneys fees, expert witness fees, and costs and disbursements in the total
amount of $18,615.40 shall bear post-judgment interest at the judicial rate until paid in full
and that this Judgment may be augmented in the amount of costs and fees incurred in
collecting such Judgment, including reasonable attorneys' fees, and that such augmentation
may be made by affidavit of counsel.
DATED this

/

day of November, 1995.
BY THE CO

APPROVED AS TO FORM:
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH

By
Randall N. Skanchy
Scott D. Cheney
Attorneys for Defendants
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CORBRIDGE, BAIRD & CHRISTENSEN

lames C. Christensen
Attorney for Plaintiff
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